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 1 
Summary 
The Commission’s decision to utilize FRAND as the Union’s premiere IPR 
licensing form in ICT standardization has sparked a debate among policy 
makers and stakeholders in the software industry regarding which licensing 
form is best suited for interoperability software standards in public 
procurement. Several voices from within the ICT industry as well as public 
authorities have openly supported the use of a royalty-free (RF) requirement 
for interoperability standards as being the more adapt option for the task at 
hand, to create interoperability and promote innovation and competition. 
This raises the question; which licensing approach would be better from a 
Competition Law perspective?  
 
The intention of this thesis and its research is to find the answer to that 
question through investigating whether or not a restriction in the form of a 
RF requirement in Article 13 of Regulation 1025/2012 would fulfill the four 
cumulative conditions in Article 101(3) TFEU and thus be considered pro-
competitive. The four conditions are that the restriction produces 
“efficiencies”, that the consumer receives their “fair share” of those 
efficiencies, that there is an “indispensability of the restriction” and that the 
restriction does not allow “elimination of competition”. 
 
For these conditions to be fulfilled in the relative context several factors 
need to be considered, such as technological and economical aspects of 
using RF or FRAND technologies, the status of the different relevant 
software markets and the situation regarding ICT procurement in different 
Stated within the Union. The investigation is focused on how these technical 
and economic aspects meet with the legal demands in EU law. 
 
This thesis makes the argument that based on the unique qualities of the 
interoperability software industry in combination with the current situation 
in public ICT procurement and the objectives of European standardization, 
such a RF requirement that is discussed in this thesis would be considered as 
pro-competitive and consequently the more adapt solution for 
interoperability standardization.   
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Sammanfattning 
Europeiska kommissionens beslut att använda sig av FRAND som den 
primära immaterialrättlsiga licensformen för teknologi inom IT 
standardisering har legat till grund för en debatt mellan beslutsfattare och 
intressenter inom mjukvaruindustrin angående vilken lisensform som bäst 
uppfyller målsättningarna med standardisering av interoperabilitet 
mjukvaror för offentlig upphandling. Flera inom IT industrin så väl som 
offentliga myndigheter har öppet stöttat royalty free (RF) tvång för 
interoperabilitet standarder som den mer optimala lösningen för dem 
föreliggande målsättningarna; att skapa interoperabilitet samt främja 
innovation och konkurrens. Detta leder till frågan, vilken av dessa två 
lisensformer är mest fördelaktig från ett konkurrensrättsligt perspektiv? 
 
Denna uppsats intention samt målsättningen med dess undersökning är att 
finna svaret på den frågan genom att utreda ifall en restriktion i form av ett 
RF tvång i artikel 13 i Regulation 1025/2012 skulle uppfylla dem fyra 
kumulativa kraven i artikel 101(3) TFEU och då anses som positivt utifrån 
ett konkurrensrättsligt perspektiv. Dessa fyra krav är att restriktionen 
producerar ”effektivitetsvinster”, att konsumenterna får en ”skälig del” av 
dessa effektivitetsvinster, att restriktionen är ”nödvändig” för realisationen 
av effektivitetsvinsterna samt att restriktionen inte ger möjlighet till att 
”eliminera konkurrens”. 
 
För att dessa krav ska vara uppfyllda i det relevanta sammanhanget så måste 
flera faktorer beaktas, så som tekniska och ekonomiska aspekter av 
användandet av RF eller FRAND teknologier, statusen på dem relevanta 
marknaderna och situation gällande offentlig IT upphandling hos EUs 
medlemsstater. Undersökning fokuserar på hur dessa tekniska och 
ekonomiska aspekter korrelerar med dem juridiska kraven inom EU rätten.   
 
Denna uppsats argumenterar för att baserat på interoperabilitet 
mjukvaruindustrins unika karaktär i kombination med den föreliggande 
situationen inom offentlig upphandling av IT och målsättningen med EU 
standardiseringen så skulle ett sådant RF krav som undersökts i denna 
uppsats ses som konkurrensrättsligt fördelaktigt och följaktligen den mest 
gynnsamma lösningen för interoperabilitet standarder.   
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Preface 
 
 
This thesis is an original, unpublished work by the author Fredrik Grip. I 
hope that you the reader find this work an educational, interesting and 
enjoyable read.  
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Abbreviations 
BSA Business Software Alliance 
 
ECIS                                              European Committee for Interoperable  
                                                      Systems  
      
EIF                                                 European Interoperability Framework 
 
EU                                                  European Union 
 
FRAND                                         Fair Reasonable and Non- 
                                                      Discriminatory 
 
GPL                                             General Public License 
 
GSM                                           Global System Mobil 
 
ICT                                              Information and Communication   
                                                      Technology 
 
IDABC                            Interoperable Delivery of European  
                                                      eGovernment Services to public     
                                                      Administrations, Businesses and Citizens 
 
IETF                                              Internet Engineering Task Force  
 
IPR                                                Intellectual Property Rights 
 
IT                                                   Information and Technology 
 
OS                                                 Operating System 
 
R & D                                           Research and Development 
 
RF                                                  Royalty Free 
 
SME                                               Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
 
SSO                                               Standard Setting Organization   
  
TFEU                                            Treaty on the Functioning of the  
                                                      European Union 
 
UK                         United Kingdom 
 
W3C                                              World Wide Web Consortium       
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1 Introduction  
 
1.1 Purpose 
  
The purpose of this thesis is to examine from a Competition Law 
perspective if the utilization of a RF policy for European interoperability 
standards would be better than the FRAND policy that is currently in use. 
This will be done through an examination of whether or not a restriction in 
the form of a RF requirement for the interoperability (ICT) standards that 
are set in accordance with Article 13 of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 
would be considered pro-competitive according to European Competition 
Law by meeting the conditions that;  
 
 - The restriction leads to efficiency gains  
 
-  Consumers receives a fair share of the resulting benefits, that is to say, 
the efficiency gains 
 
- The restrictions is indispensable to the attainment of those objectives, that 
is to say, the efficiency gains    
 
- The agreement does not afford the parties the possibility of eliminating 
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question 
 
This thesis will based on the investigation produce a conclusion regarding 
the potential fulfilment of these four cumulative conditions as well as an 
analysis of the current legal situation regarding IPR licensing forms in 
European ICT standardization. 
 
1.2 Method and Material  
The subject of this thesis is approached by using a legal dogmatic method. 
In this aspect, the examination has mainly touched on the applicable 
Competition laws regulating standardization within the European Union. I 
have for this purpose investigated the Treaties of the Union as well as 
several Communications, Guidelines and Frameworks in order to better 
understand the full scope and aspirations of European ICT standardization 
and its relationship with European Competition Law. 
 
Legislation, initiatives, policies and communications of Member States have 
also been researched to the extent they hold importance for the effectiveness 
of Union policy and for the relevant discussion in general. 
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To gain a more profound understanding of how to correctly interpret the 
Conditions in Article 101(3) TFEU and how the bodies of the Union have 
dealt with similar situations to better examine the status of the investigated 
situation in this thesis I have used several cases and decisions to my aid. 
        
Doctrine and articles have been used to further develop the theoretical 
understanding of the subject regarding the legal as well as the technological 
and economical aspects the subject. To this, I might add that due to the 
novity of the subject, both in regards to the provision discussed and the 
debate regarding RF vs FRAND, there are not much classical legal doctrine 
on this subject. Especially since the debate, regarding different licensing 
forms for interoperability standards in public procurement is a legal 
question arising in recent years, and the particular discussion in this thesis is 
a rather narrow one.    
 
Since the scope of this thesis is to investigate whether technological and 
economical qualities meet with legal demands I have gone to fields outside 
of the legal realm to find necessary information. To this end, I have used 
researches, studies, interviews, statements and opinions of and by 
authorities, experts, policy makers and other important figures regarding the 
actual and possible effects of using different licensing forms. This has been 
crucial in properly assessing how the use of these license approaches would 
meet with the legal demands in European Competition Law. 
 
1.3 Outline 
After this introduction, the second chapter will start the thesis of by 
recounting the background to the discussion at hand. This background will 
first outline the problems that public procurers of ICT faces, and that 
creating interoperability standards is the most adapt tool to resolve those 
problems. Then a description of the general relationship between standards 
and competition law will follow, which will lead to the relevant question 
regarding the licensing forms RF and FRAND. The scheme that the 
investigation of the thesis be based on will then be described, so to give the 
reader a full understanding of the context relevant for the following 
investigation. 
 
After the background, a review of the X/Open case will follow. A case that 
bare resemblance to the situation examined in this thesis on several levels, 
in type of restriction as well as efficiencies produced. This is to give an idea 
of how the Commission values and distinguishes the restrictions and 
efficiencies related to the questioning at hand.  
 
The fourth chapter that follows is the investigation itself and thus the central 
part of this thesis. Every condition will there be discussed individually and 
in chronological order. First, through a description regarding what the 
condition constitutes according the relevant EU provisions and case law 
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followed by the investigation as to the effects that the use of RF technology 
and standardisation have in both theory and practice in regards to the 
condition. 
 
The last chapter will be where based on the information found in the 
previous chapters the conclusion regarding whether or not a RF restriction 
in Article 13 would fulfil the four conditions and thus considered pro-
competitive will be made. There will also be an analysis of the general 
situation regarding the IPR licensing in European interoperability standards.      
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2 Background 
 
2.1 Vendor Lock-in 
 
The technological progress in the “Information and Communication 
Technology” (ICT) sector have been of great benefit to citizens, companies 
and public authorities and have become an integrated part in everyday life. 
The rapid development and the constant innovation that is the nature of the 
ICT industry is however in some cases the source of problems for public 
procurers, especially by creating situations of vendor lock-in.  
 
Vendor lock-in is a situation in which a customer using a product or service 
cannot easily transition to a competitor’s product or service. This is usually 
the result of proprietary technologies that are incompatible with the 
technologies of competitors. Lock-in also goes hand in hand with dominant 
position, which is a common situation in the software industry. Not always 
because the dominant software is more cost effective or better performing 
than the competitors but because of the need for network effects
1
 in the ICT 
market.
2
 What happens in these situations is that public authorities enter into 
contracts with providers of ICT in order to use an ICT product or service for 
a certain period of time. Lock-in then happens when the public authority 
cannot easily change provider after the expiration of this period of time, 
because not all essential information about the system is available for 
efficient takeover by another provider. To change provider is in these cases 
is very costly and it is often cheaper to stay with the same provider even if 
the services are more expensive and of inferior quality.
3
  
 
The negative impact of lock-in also affects the competition in the ICT 
market and can create barriers to entry and lead to dominant positions. This 
lack of competition often leads to higher prices and around 1.1 billion euro 
is unnecessarily lost per year in the public sector alone.
4
 
 
Surveys have shown that a large number of procurement officials in the 
European Union consider changing their existing ICT solution as too costly 
since it would involve changing many other systems that uses the data of the 
system that they would like to change. Of those surveyed, a significant 
                                                 
1 For information on network effects see inter alia 
https://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Network_effect.html and/or  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_effect 
2 http://www.linfo.org/vendor_lockin.html 
3 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION “Against lock-in: building open ICT systems by making 
better use of standards in public Procurement” page 2 
4 COMMUNICATION ”Against lock-in” page 2  
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number also felt they would not be able to change their ICT solutions for 
fear that their information would not be transferable and thus lost.
5
 
 
The most efficient way to prevent vendor lock-in and similar problems is by 
creating software-to-software interoperability. Interoperability means the 
ability of information and communication technology (ICT) systems and of 
the business processes they support to exchange data and to enable the 
sharing of information and knowledge,
6
 meaning in this situation that 
interoperability enables authorities to change between different software 
systems without losing information or forcing a complete overhaul of their 
IT system. The presence of interoperability would also diminish the vendor 
dependence around the software since products and services from different 
producers would be made compatible, thus making it easier and more 
efficient to integrate one public system with another for the exchange of 
data, which would also benefit rival competition in the market and 
consequently lowering prices and raise efficiency.
7
 
 
So if the objective is to create and support interoperability, what is the most 
efficient way to accomplish that objective? 
 
2.2 Interoperability Standards  
 
The consensus between authorities as well as other stakeholders seems to be 
that the use of common interoperability standards is the best way to create 
interoperability and prevent problems in ICT procurement.
8
 
 
Standards are agreed upon ways of doing things. More exactly a “standard” 
is a set of technical specifications which either does, or intends to, provide a 
common design for a product or process. When done correctly standards 
should lead to efficiencies and consumer benefits. Standardization activities 
can be considered especially important in markets like ICT industries, where 
the need for devices and networks to interoperate creates benefits and 
incentives for industry participants to devise common technical standards.
9
 
For there to be real interoperability there is a need for the different 
manufacturers to use the same specification and for them to do that there is a 
need for standardization, hence for the creation of interoperability there is a 
need for standardization.
10
 
 
                                                 
5 Europe Economics Chancery House” (2011) Draft guidelines and measures to improve ICT procurement, Survey 
results” and Björn Lundell “e-Governance in public sector ICT procurement: what is shaping practice in Sweden?” 
6 Definition from EUROPEAN INTEROPERABILITY FRAMEWORK FOR PAN-EUROPEAN 
eGOVERNMENT SERVICES “EIF” version 1.0  
7 R.A Ghosh (2005) “An economic basis for open standards” FLOSSPOLS project 
8 See generally K Blind, S Gauch, R Hawkins (2010) “How stakeholders view the impacts of international ICT 
standards” and M Shaikh, T Cornford “Total cost of ownership of open source software: a report for the UK 
Cabinet Office supported by OpenForum Europe” 
9 M MacCarthy (2009) ” Open Standards, Competition and Patent Policies” 
10 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION “A strategic vision for European standards: Moving forward 
to enhance and accelerate the sustainable growth of the European economy by 2020” 
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The Commission has in “A Digital Agenda for Europe” recognized the 
problems of vendor lock-in in ICT procurement and highlights the need for 
standards to create interoperability between devices, applications, data 
repositories, services and networks so to deal with the problems and enable 
technological progress.
11
 The Commission and other department have for 
this purpose created a number of Communications and Frameworks to help 
ICT procurers avoid lock-in and become more efficient. The European 
Union has also put increased emphasis on standardization in general to 
promote technological advances and innovation within the European 
Community.  
 
To achieve these aspirations the Commission has created Regulation No 
1025/2012 (Regulation), the Standardization Regulation, for which the 
objectives are to promote interoperability, innovation and competition.
12
 
Regarding the issue of ICT procurement and interoperability the most 
important provision of the Regulation is Article 13, which in paragraph 1 
states that:  
 
“Either on proposal from a Member State or on its own initiative the 
Commission may decide to identify ICT technical specifications that are not 
national, European or international standards, but meet the requirements 
set out in Annex II, which may be referenced, primarily to enable 
interoperability, in public procurement”.13 A following question is then if 
this provision would accomplish its objective of benefiting competition.  
 
2.3 Standards and Competition Law 
 
When a standard becomes widely implemented on the relevant market, 
which is necessary for the standard to be effective and beneficial, it 
consequently means that technology outside the standard will be 
implemented to a lesser extent, thus reducing inter-technology competition. 
This also means that products that don’t implement the standard will 
consequently experience difficulty in gaining access to the market and to 
make profits, implying that a successful standard can constitute a form a 
barrier to market entry.
14
 So a widely implemented standard have some 
disadvantages from a competition perspective.   
 
The competitive advantages however trump the disadvantages. Beyond the 
above mentioned interoperability benefits standardization also stabilizes the 
technology market mitigating risks for producers while at the same time 
increases the speed in adaptation. Standardization also promotes 
technological innovation that usually enables new and improved products to 
                                                 
11  See COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION “A Digital Agenda for Europe” 
12 REGULATION (EU) No 1025/2012 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 25 
October 2012 see preamble for scope 
13 REGULATION (EU) No 1025/2012 Article 13 §1 
14 M Glader “OPEN STANDARDS: PUBLIC POLICY ASPECTS AND COMPETITION LAW 
REQUIREMENTS” in European Competition Journal (2010) VOL. 6 NO. 3 page 614 
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appear on the market.
15
 That is why standards are considered as increasing 
competition and thus benefiting the economy while lowering costs and thus 
benefiting the consumers. Standard agreements are because of these positive 
effects considered in the Horizontal Guidelines to presumably not distort 
competition under Article 101(1) TFEU because they would most likely 
fulfill the conditions laid down in Article 101(3) TFEU which would render 
the assessment of the agreement as pro-competitive.
16
 
  
When considering the benefits and deficits of standardization from a 
competition perspective the question of “what” is being standardized, is also 
an important factor. On the ICT market the need for common standards is 
considered more significant than on most markets due to network effects,
17
 
meaning that the standardization advantages are the greatest regarding 
interoperability software. So competition within the standard is to prefer 
over inter-technology competition, since inter-technology competition in 
markets with strong network effects tends to create dominant positions for 
the manufacturer of key technology and thus closing out the competitors, 
and in the end causes a decline in competition. Competition within the 
standard works, on the contrary, in a more inclusive fashion in the presence 
of network effects and creates the intended benefits of standardization, such 
as increased competition, lower prices and a more innovative market.
18
 
 
Despite the general benefits, standardization is not immune to causing 
negative effects on competition, especially through “reduction in price 
competition, foreclosure of innovative technologies and exclusion of, or 
discrimination against, certain companies by prevention of effective access 
to the standard”, which is recognized in the Horizontal Guidelines.19 
 
2.4 IP Licensing in ICT Standards 
 
A complicated question concerning standardization that can cause 
competition problems to arise is the question of how to deal with the  
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) included in the standard. There are many 
different technologies involved that may or may not be covered by patents 
when setting a standard, especially in the ICT market. The owners of the 
patented technology that has been included in the standard could, if not 
restricted, become gatekeepers to the technology and thus the market itself 
and enjoy a significant increase in market power due to licensing.
20
 Such a 
situation could present unfair advantages to IPR holder while having the 
                                                 
15 M Glader (2010) page 614 and COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION “Guidelines on the 
applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation 
agreements” §263 
16 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION “Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements” 
17 M Glader (2010) page 615 
18 M MacCarthy (2009) page 15 
19 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION “Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements” §264 
20 M Glader (2010) page 614 
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opposite impact on their competitors, thus creating barriers to entry, a strong 
possibility for dominant position and a general distortion of competition on 
the relevant market. 
 
To mitigate the risk of such competitive complications most SSOs 
implements licensing policies to ensure that the standard can be used by as 
many as possible while simultaneously attracting as many technology 
holders to participate in the standardization process as possible, to not 
exclude technology that could potentially benefit the standard. 
 
The IPR approach of Article 13 of the Regulation is found in §4 (c) of 
Annex II and states: intellectual property rights essential to the 
implementation of specifications are licensed to applicants on a (fair) 
reasonable and non-discriminatory basis ((F)RAND), which includes, at the 
discretion of the intellectual property right-holder, licensing essential 
intellectual property without compensation.
21
 This means that the licensing 
obligation for the ICT interoperability standards is the so called FRAND 
which in this case also includes the possibility for licensing on royalty-free 
(RF) basis. The inclusion of FRAND in the Regulation stems from the 
promotion of FRAND in the Horizontal Guidelines that regulates 
standardization agreements in European Competition Law. 
 
FRAND stands for “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory”, 
“reasonable” is a term designed to indicate the royalty fee must somehow 
be balanced, not excessive in terms of the connection to the benefits 
conferred by the underlying technology. “Fair” suggests just treatment of 
each licensee in respect to the circumstances of implementation. ”Non-
discrimination” implies that the licensee is not allowed to treat similarly 
situated licensees differently when imposing fees or other terms and 
conditions, and also that the patent holder cannot deny the right to license.
22
 
Agreeing to these conditions is intended to prevent the IPR holders from 
potential licensing abuse and decrease the monopolistic advantages that 
often are the result of having ones technology included in an important 
standard. 
 
FRAND is a licensing form used by many SSOs and is effective as well as 
popular in many technological industries, such as the telecom market. In the 
IT sector however, the FRAND approach is not as commonly used in 
standardization as in other industries.
23
  
 
A majority of IT stakeholders on the other hand, especially in the software 
industry and among its users, are of the opinion that a more satisfactory 
level of interoperability can be achieved using IPR policies which could be 
perceived to differ from a (F)RAND approach.
24
 
                                                 
21 REGULATION (EU) No 1025/2012 Anexx II ” REQUIREMENTS FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF ICT 
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS” §4 (c) 
22 M MacCarthy (2009) page 10 
23 M Glader (2010) page 642 
24 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, WHITE PAPER “Modernizing ICT Standardization 
in the EU- The Way Forward” page 9   
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2.5 FRAND vs RF 
 
The SSOs in the ICT market seem to hold a preference towards RF in the 
place of FRAND when setting standards.
25
 The RF approach have been 
openly supported by several important stakeholders and governments to take 
priority over FRAND when concerning matters of interoperability, to 
enhance efficiency, innovation, interoperability as well as reaching the 
widest possible implementation of the standard.
26
 It has been suggested that 
the fact that the majority of software interoperability standards are available 
on a RF basis has been the key to the innovation around internet and web 
technologies,
27
 leading many to the opinion that software interoperability 
standards should be licensed on RF terms.  
 
On the other hand the RF approach have also received its fair share of 
condemnation from influential private software lobbying groups as well as 
from a number of  SSOs for having negative effects on innovation and 
competition. The negative impacts highlighted by the opposition of RF is 
that by taking away the possibility to receive royalty payments the incentive 
for innovative companies relying on such an income to keep innovating is 
subsequently removed, and thus rendering the standard without important 
technologies as well as hindering innovation.
28
 Another important question 
stemming from the critique is, if mandating RF standards would be 
considered discriminatory against companies whose business model is based 
on collecting licensing fees for their patented technology and thus restricting 
competition by making these companies reluctant to partake in the 
standardization process, which could also result in a lower quality 
standard.
29
 
 
This background gives rise to the questioning; if including a RF requirement 
in Article 13 of the Regulation would be more beneficial than the currently 
used FRAND from a European Competition perspective. Would RF be 
better for interoperability and prevent vendor lock-in more efficiently and 
thus have more pro-competitive effects? 
 
2.6 Article 101(3) TFEU 
 
When examining if the pro-competitive effects of a restriction outweighs the 
negative effects, one has to follow the procedure laid down in Article 101(3) 
                                                 
25 M Glader (2010) page 642 
26 See inter alia ECIS Statement on the proposed new European Interoperability Framework (2010) and N Kroes 
“How to get more interoperability in Europe Address” 
27 D Weitzner (2004) ” Standards, Patents and the Dynamics of Innovation on the World Wide Web” 
28 C Mair (2012) ” Openness, Intellectual Property and Standardization in the European ICT Sector” page 2-3 
29 M Glader (2010) page 642 
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TFEU. This is generally done when a restriction of competition have been 
found under Article 101(1) TFEU and Article 101(3) TFEU can then be 
invoked as a defense.
30
 This is not saying that a RF requirement would be 
considered infringing Article 101(1) TFEU if included in the Article, but 
when making an assessment of the positive and negative effects from a 
Competition Law perspective it is done following the procedure in Article 
101(3) TFEU.  
 
For a restriction to be deemed pro-competitive it needs to fulfill the four 
cumulative conditions stipulated in Article 101(3) TFEU, of which two are 
positive and two are negative. These conditions are that;  
 
- The agreement (in this case the provision) must contribute to improving 
the production or distribution of products or contribute to promoting 
technical or economic progress, that is to say, lead to efficiency gains  
 
-  Consumers must receive a fair share of the resulting benefits, that is to 
say, the efficiency gains 
 
- The restrictions must be indispensable to the attainment of those 
objectives, that is to say, the efficiency gains    
 
- The agreement (in this case the provision) must not afford the parties the 
possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the 
products in question 
31
  
 
From Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 that regulates 
implementation of Article 101(3) TFEU it follows that the burden of proof 
for 101(3) TFEU is on the one claiming benefit from the provision, which in 
this case would be the proponents of RF standardization.
32
The discussion 
will therefore put the emphasis on RF and the impact it might have on 
competition and focus less on FRAND. 
 
The comparison between RF and FRAND regarding software 
interoperability standards is to a certain extent a discussion about open-
source and proprietary software. For more general information on open-
source and proprietary software and their relationship with the different 
licenses that might be helpful to fully comprehend the following discussion 
I suggest reading the linked information.
33
  
  
                                                 
30 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION “Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements” § 20 
31 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION “Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements” § 49 
32 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, Article 2 
33 See inter alia http://www.linfo.org/proprietary.html for proprietary software definition and 
http://opensource.com/resources/what-open-source and https://www.gnu.org/copyleft/ for information about open 
source and copyleft licenses which is a commonly used license for open source projects   
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3 X/Open 
 
Before initiating the discussion concerning the conditions in Article 101(3) 
TFEU it might be interesting to see how the Commission has dealt with 
similar situations. There are not many cases that bear resemblance to the 
situation at hand but the X/Open Case from 1986 have some clear 
similarities.
34
  
 
In the case, several important software companies from different countries 
formed the X/Open group with the objective to create open industry 
standards consisting in a stable but evolving common application 
environment for software based on AT&Ts operating system “Unix”.35 
Different non-interoperable versions of Unix existed on the market meaning 
that applications made for one Unix version would have to be modified to 
be compatible with another version. The group seeking to solve that 
problem aimed to select appropriate interfaces that national and 
international standardization bodies could select to create a common 
software environment through interoperability.
36
  
 
The X/Open group had decided on restrictive requirements for membership, 
which demanded inter alia that applicants have IT revenues of over 50 
million US dollars per year, as well as limiting admission to significant 
players in the IT marker with deep knowledge of Unix.
37
 The question that 
then arose was if these requirements constituted a distortion of competition. 
The Commission first confirmed that there were restrictions on membership 
and that there were competitive disadvantages for non-members in not being 
able to impact the standards as well as advantages for the members in the 
possibility to influence the standard, better know-how and first-mover 
advantages. Based on this the Commission drew to the conclusion that the 
requirements for membership in the X/Open group constituted a competitive 
distortion under Article 101(1) TFEU.
38
  
 
The next step for the Commission was to examine the overall advantages 
and disadvantages of the restriction using Article 101(3) TFEU. The 
Commission was of the opinion that the advantages of creating an open 
industry standard that enables interoperability and establishes a platform for 
innovation clearly outweighed the possible disadvantages caused by the 
group.
39
 The Commission found that the technological efficiencies would 
benefit the consumers by making an increased number of applications 
available as well as that the increased interoperability would render users 
less dependent on the manufacturer of their system and thus increasing 
                                                 
34 Commission decision 87/69/EEC of 15 December 1986 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 
of the EEC Treaty (IV/31.458 ° X/Open Group) 
35 http://www.unix.org/what_is_unix.html for information on Unix OS  
36 Commission decision 87/69/EEC §1-5  
37 Commission decision 87/69/EEC §12-14 
38 Commission decision 87/69/EEC §30-41 
39 Commission decision 87/69/EEC §42 
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consumer options. Concerning the indispensability of the restriction the 
Commission found that it was necessary for the efficiency of the group that 
they had the ability to only include members of a certain stature and know-
how in the IT market and especially regarding the Unix operating system. 
The restriction was thus considered indispensable for the attainment of the 
efficiencies. Regarding possible elimination of competitors it was clear that 
the group was going to offer the products developed between themselves 
and other competitors on an open basis, so no possibility to eliminate 
competition would stem from the agreement, all conditions in Article 101(3) 
TFEU was thus fulfilled.
40
   
 
This case is rather old and is not an exact replica of the situation at hand but 
since it concerns software interoperability standards there are similarities 
and important indications to be taken from the reasoning of the 
Commission. The type of restriction in the form of excluding competitors 
from influencing the standard in X/Open was more apparent than a RF 
requirement, which would rather make patent holders reluctant to join the 
standardization process than forbidding them to do so. But the effect is to a 
certain degree the same in as much as both would result in competitors left 
out of the standardization process because of the restriction. 
  
The Commission confirmed that enabling interoperability, promoting 
innovation and creating new products for consumers are to be considered 
efficiencies that fulfill the first condition of Article 101(3) TFEU. 
 
Hence, this case shows the kind of efficiencies that should be realized 
regarding interoperability standards and the way the Commission handled a 
similar situation in 1986.       
 
 
 
                                                 
40 Commission decision 87/69/EEC § 43-47 
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4 The four Conditions 
 
4.1 First Condition 
 
4.1.1 Efficiencies 
 
According to the first condition of Article 101(3) TFEU, the restrictive 
agreement must contribute to improving the production or distribution of 
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, hence “produce 
efficiencies”. These efficiencies are to be assessed from an objective 
standpoint and from the case law it follows that subjective efficiency 
especially as a result of a dominant position is not to be seen as efficiencies 
within the meaning of this condition.
4142
 To find out how to interpret what 
actually constitutes “efficiencies” the “Guidelines on the application of 
Article 81(3) (101(3)) of the Treaty” (Guidelines) must be consulted. The 
efficiencies described in the Guidelines are divided into two groups, “Cost” 
and “Qualitative”. Since most of the potential cost efficiencies gained by 
using RF and open-source software are related to the consumer I have 
chosen to discuss only the qualitative efficiencies in this chapter leaving the 
cost efficiencies to the later discussion regarding consumer benefits. 
 
 So what counts as qualitative efficiencies? From the Guidelines and case 
law it follows that promoting innovation and the making available of new or 
improved products are to be seen as such efficiencies.
4344
As well as 
technological advancement in the form of enhancing interoperability
45
 or 
making products, updates and services available to the consumer quicker. 
The latter example could be seen as effectiveness in the stricter sense.
46
 The 
objective of the Regulation is to promote interoperability and innovation 
and those efficiencies were also recognized by the Commission in the 
X/Open case, those are thus the efficiencies that the focus will be on in this 
chapter.    
 
                                                 
41 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION (2004/C 101/08) Guidelines on the application of Article 
81(3) of the Treaty §49  
42 See JOINED CASES 56 AND 58/64 “Consten Grundig”   
43 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION (2004/C 101/08) Guidelines on the application of Article 
81(3) of the Treaty §71 
44 See Commission decision in GEAE/P&W (OJ 2000 L 58, p. 16) and Asahi/Saint Gobain (OJ 1994 L 354, page 
87) 
45 See Commission Decision in Atlas (OJ 1996 L 239, p. 23) 
46 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION (2004/C 101/08) Guidelines on the application of Article 
81(3) of the Treaty p.71 
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4.1.2 Innovation and new Products 
 
The main critique against RF requirements in ICT standardization is that 
such requirements would undermine the incentive for patent holders to 
contribute their latest technology to the standard, resulting in less innovation 
and competition regarding European products.
47
 This critique has been 
expressed by first and foremost the proprietary software lobby who openly 
voiced their concern to the European Union as well as to Member States that 
are considering procurement initiatives that would favor the RF approach.
48
 
There have also been those with less personal incentive in the promotion of 
royalty bearing standards that have recognized the lack of incentive to 
innovate as a weakness in the RF approach.
49
 
  
There is a large fluctuation between the different markets regarding the 
potential need for royalties as innovation incentives, and the RF approach 
would not be appropriate for all of them. Royalties are needed on markets 
such as GSM technologies where they act as incentive to balance the capital 
requirements for the production of expensive hardware, and licensing and 
royalties are only a small part of the total cost in that situation.
50
 But can the 
same thing be said regarding interoperability software; does lack of potential 
royalties stifle innovation, or does it on contrary enable and support it? The 
development of the “Web” and the “Open-Source” movements would 
certainly support the latter of these suggestions. 
 
The Web was started with the first web page in 1991 and had in 2004 
already over 2 billion pages running, connecting people and companies all 
over the world, enabling many new business and products to evolve such as 
e-commerce and social networking.
51
 The Web is also the birthplace of 
many successful companies, e.g. Google, one of the biggest and most 
innovative companies in the world that started as and still is mostly famous 
for being a search engine which helps users locate pages on the Web.
52
 
Among other prolific web companies are “Facebook”, “eBay”, 
“Amazon.com” and “Yahoo!”. This briefly shows the tip of the iceberg that 
is the innovative capacity of the Web. 
  
One of the key factors behind this innovative potential is that the Web is 
guided by standards that ensure the freedom for anyone to create and use 
websites without paying royalties. All the key web standards recommended 
by W3C, the standard organization of the Web
53
 were in fact created to be 
implemented without royalty payments. The W3C is one of the few large 
SSOs that have a strict RF policy, which based on the growth and 
innovation of the Web does not seem to have slowed them down. Neither 
                                                 
47 See BSA letter (2010) in regard to the draft of EIF version 2.0    
48Business Software Alliance (BSA), (composed of, inter allia, Microsoft, Apple and Adobe) http://www.bsa.org/  
49 See e.g. T Simcroe (2005) “Open Standards and Intellectual Property Rights” page 31  
50 See R.A Ghosh (2005) and  M MacCarthy (2009) page 13   
51 D Weitzner (2004) ” Standards, Patents and the Dynamics of Innovation on the World Wide Web” 
52 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google 
53 World Wide Web Concortium (W3C)  http://www.w3.org/ 
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does their RF policy make IT companies reluctant to join them, with 
members spanning from small computer companies to technology giants 
like Apple, Microsoft
54
 and Google they basically cover the entire industry. 
On the contrary it has been suggested that it is thanks to their RF policy that 
the members can effectively work together to develop key standards
55
 in 
situations where they otherwise would have had to overcome licensing and 
royalty negotiations that could have made the collaboration impossible or at 
the very least more troublesome and time-consuming. The RF environment 
surrounding web standards is therefore seen as a key factor in the rapid and 
exponential development of the Web. The absence of royalties can thus 
seemingly enable collaborations and make innovations possible that 
otherwise would not have come to fruition.
56
  
 
The question can be made if the members join W3C to have the opportunity 
to participate in setting some of the most important standards in the industry 
despite of the RF policy, or if the policy itself is one of the reasons why so 
many stakeholders are willing to participate?  
 
At one point the W3C patent policy group presented a suggestion to include 
both FRAND and RF as licensing possibilities for their standards. The 
negative reactions from the public and a large number of members however, 
caused the suggestion to be abandoned and never implemented. Some 
members have promoted or suggested the inclusion of FRAND as an option, 
but the overwhelming majority supports the RF policy and the reactions 
from the public have only been positive.
57
  
 
The creator of the Web Sir Tim Berners-Lee (knighted for his 
accomplishments regarding the Web) has always shown support for the RF 
requirement; “the decision to base the Web on royalty-free standards from 
the beginning has been vital to its success until now. The open platform of 
royalty-free standards enabled software companies to profit by selling new 
products with powerful features, enabled e-commerce companies to profit 
from services that on this foundation, and brought social benefits in the non-
commercial realm beyond simple economic valuation. By adopting this 
Patent Policy with its commitment to royalty-free standards for the future, 
we are laying the foundation for another decade of technical innovation, 
economic growth, and social advancement.”58 Clearing any potential doubts 
as to whether the community that created the Web considers royalties a 
positive or negative influence on internet innovations. 
 
Another good example where RF innovation has prospered is within the 
Open-source community. Even though the Web and open-source are far 
from separate since the Web is based partly on open-source software, I have 
chosen to discuss the subjects somewhat separately.  
 
                                                 
54 Both also members of BSA 
55 The “XML 11” project including, Microsoft, Packard-Bell, Sun and eight other collaborators 
56 D Weitzner (2004) ” Standards, Patents and the Dynamics of Innovation on the World Wide Web” 
57 Tim Berners-Lee, W3C Director (2003) “Director's Decision, W3C Patent Policy” 
58 D Weitzner (2004) ” Standards, Patents and the Dynamics of Innovation on the World Wide Web” 
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The basis of open-source is freedom for the user to do more or less whatever 
he or she wants with the software, and the licensing scheme places demands 
on the manufacturer rather than on the consumer. This freedom includes 
rewriting, developing and redistributing the software, for commercial as 
well as uncommercial purposes.
59
 Because of the “freedom” that open-
source gives to its users and potential developers; it can arguably be seen as 
an optimal platform for innovation.  
 
The software most representative of the open-source movement and 
possibly the best example of the innovative potential of the open-source 
platform is “Linux”, an open sourced freely-modifiable operating system 
that holds great resemblance to Unix, the operating system in the X/Open 
case. Since the beginning of its development in 1991 the Linux operating 
system has been modified, developed and “distributed” by many 
companies
60
 re-tailoring the operating system for desktops as well as 
servers. It has grown exponentially on several markets and has become the 
leading operating system for both servers and mainframes, and when this 
thesis is written 485 of the top 500 supercomputers in the world are running 
on Linux rendering it the dominant platform in one of the most 
technologically important industries.
61
 The freedom to change and develop 
the software is also making it adaptable to different firmware systems and 
thus prominent on several markets that hold little resemblance to one 
another, e.g. “smart-tv” and network routers.62 But the most recognizable 
Linux based product is most likely Google’s operative system “android” 
which is the number one operating system for smartphones and tablets in the 
world and is built on top of the Linux system.
63
  
 
The original Linux developers haven’t been the ones driving the innovation 
in and around the Linux community but have instead laid the foundations 
for others to innovate, which have been a hugely successful method. What is 
especially interesting for this discussion is that all the innovations and new 
products spawned from Linux have been completely without the incentive 
of royalties, since Linux is registered under a “copyleft” license, people 
and/or companies
64
 are free to use and redistribute the new products that 
they produce based on the original code, but not to demand royalty 
payments for those derivative products.
65
 
 
It is the freedom to produce derivative products that sets apart the open-
source from proprietary software when it comes to innovation. On the office 
suite market for example, the proprietary software MS Office is the 
dominant software (de facto standard), but the biggest competitor Open 
Office has still spawned a large number of derivatives
66
 despite of its 
                                                 
59 See http://opensource.org/definition for open source license definitions 
60 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Linux_distributions for full list of Linux distributions 
61 See http://www.top500.org/statistics/sublist/ for full list 
62 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_router_and_firewall_distributions, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_smart_TV_platforms_and_middleware_software for examples 
63 See http://marketshare.hitslink.com/operating-system-market-
share.aspx?qprid=8&qpcustomd=1&qptimeframe=M 
64 Inter allia Google, Red Hat, Samsung etc  
65 For more information about ”Copyleft” see https://www.gnu.org/copyleft/ 
66 See https://wiki.openoffice.org/wiki/DerivedWorks for list of derivative works  
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significantly smaller market share. On the contrary, MS Office has not 
produced any derivative products since its license strictly forbids derivative 
works, making it less beneficial from an innovation standpoint.
67
 The fact 
that open-source software is “free” and developers are not looking for 
royalty payments might actually give a boost to innovation and productivity 
rather than preventing it. Since the development of proprietary software 
depends on the R&D funding from the manufacturer of the product, the 
tradeoff will have to be made between profit and innovation based on the 
future profit from the expected R&D results. In the situation that a 
proprietary y software is dominant on the relevant market there is thus a 
strong possibility that the bigger the market share enjoyed by that software 
the less the incentive will be to innovate, since the sales most likely will be 
the same regardless, because of network effects.
68
 In the open-source 
community on the other hand the situation is quite different since developers 
contribute for free, and despite lack of monetary incitement the open-source 
community has thus far had little problems attracting skillful developers 
who prefer working in open organizational cultures. People are generally 
eager to help and improve the things they use to enhance their own 
experiences as well as others and with open-source that opportunity is given 
to every single user.
69
 As a consequence, more developers will contribute to 
an open-source than proprietary software in average.
70
 So in the situation of 
high market shares where a proprietary company might lose incentive to 
innovate, the open-source software would get an increased number of 
potential developers and thus become more effective and innovative as the 
market share and numbers of users grow.  
 
Not only the open-source and web communities have a positive attitude 
towards RF requirement in the software industry, there are also prominent 
ICT companies of the more traditional kind that despite having large IP 
portfolios still support RF licensing. The perhaps most prominent example, 
ECIS
71
 with members such as IBM, Oracle and Nokia, some of the most 
innovative companies in the industry, is of the opinion that “the open-
source is a powerful movement that drives innovation forward”.72 These 
companies also donate resources to the development of open-source and 
clearly see a lucrative innovative market, even without royalty based 
incentives.
73
 
 
In the software market not only does patents and royalty not seem to be a 
necessary incitement for innovations, voices in the industry have also 
suggested that patents and royalties “too often these days they serve merely 
                                                 
67 See generally, R.A Ghosh (2005)   
68 J-M Dalle, (2001) “OPEN-SOURCE vs. PROPRIETARY SOFTWARE” page 5 
69 “Why Open-Source Principles Are a Recipe For Innovation” 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashoka/2012/07/25/why-open-source-principles-are-a-recipe-for-innovation 
70 J-M Dalle, (2001) pages 5-6 
71 European Committee for Interoperable Systems (ECIS) (2007) “It is standard industry practice to offer 
interoperability information royalty free”  
72 “ECIS Statement on the proposed new European Interoperability Framework 13/10” 2010, written in response to 
the letter from the BSA  
73 See inter allia, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/11/technology/11soft.html?_r=0, 
http://www.infoworld.com/article/2612196/linux/ibm-s--1-billion-linux-investment--buying-power.html and 
http://www.teslamotors.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you 
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to stifle progress” 74 and that “software interoperability standards should be 
available royalty-free because of the high potential of innovation that lies in 
the integration of technologies and on top of the standards”.75  
 
4.1.3 Interoperability 
 
“Interoperability means the ability of information and communication 
technology (ICT) systems and of the business processes they support to 
exchange data and to enable the sharing of information and knowledge”.76 It 
is in other words the enabling of different software to work together to 
connect businesses, organizations and people. Enabling interoperability is as 
stated earlier the scope of ICT standardization, and one of the key objectives 
in the Digital Agenda of the Union, representing the increased priority of 
this question for the future of European e-procurement.
77
 We have also seen 
that without interoperability, governments and authorities will run an 
increased risk of vendor lock-in.
78
 Consensus is clear as to the facts that 
interoperability is desirable, that lock-in is negative and that standards are 
the most effective tool available to solve these problems. But are there 
benefits in using RF standard to achieve them?  
 
The Digital Agenda that stipulates the objectives of the Union in regards to 
interoperability and standards starts with proclaiming that: “The internet is 
the best example of the power of technical interoperability. Its open 
architecture gave interoperable devices and applications to billions around 
the world.” 79 The key behind the success of the Internet has been the 
interoperability standards that constitute the base of its development. These 
standards are developed by the standardization body “IETF”,80 that unlike 
the W3C does not require RF for a technology to be eligible for 
recommendation. Instead they have as in Article 13 the choice between 
FRAND and RF to not exclude any technology that could possibly be 
beneficial to the Internet.
81
 The IETF even though lacking a RF policy hold 
a clear preference towards RF and Internet standards are almost always 
available on a RF basis (97 %) including the key internet standards, such as 
the well-known transmission control protocol and internet protocol 
(TCP/IP). The fact that no permissions or royalties restricted the use of the 
Internet was a key factor in creating the Web which is often used 
synonymous with the Internet and is itself one of the best examples of well-
                                                 
74 Elon Musk, CEO of Tesla Motors (2014) ”all our patents belong to you” 
75 Opinion of Jochen Friedrich Head of Technical Relations Europe in IBM, in European Commission report 
(2012) “Implementing FRAND standards in Open Source: Business as usual or mission impossible?”    
76 Definition from, “EUROPEAN INTEROPERABILITY FRAMEWORK FOR PAN-EUROPEAN 
eGOVERNMENT SERVICES version 1.0 p 1.1.2 
77See COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION  “A Digital Agenda for Europe” 
78COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION “Against lock-in: building open ICT systems by making 
better use of standards in public 
Procurement”  
79COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION  “A Digital Agenda for Europe” § 2.2  
80 Internet Engineering Task Force (EITF) https://www.ietf.org/ 
81 Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Policy of IETF, https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3979.txt 
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functioning software interoperability.
82
 The Web is also what made the 
Internet usable and popular among “regular” people, and unquestionably a 
key factor in making the Internet as utilized and interoperable as it is today. 
It thus seems probable that the Internet and the Web would not be as 
interoperable as they are today if the standards they are built on required 
royalty payments. 
    
In its efforts to promote interoperability the IDABC
83
 developed the EIF 
(European Interoperability Framework) a set of interoperability guidelines, 
that have stirred up quite the discussion regarding whether a RF requirement 
is necessary for maximal interoperability. In the first edition, the EIF 1.0 it 
was stated that a standard was to be “made irrevocably available on a 
royalty-free basis” to be considered an “open standard” together with a clear 
recommendation for using such standards. In the same recommendation was 
also an encouragement to access the benefits of open-source software,
84
 thus 
expressing a clear preference towards the use of RF standards to fully enable 
interoperability. The definition of “open” in the EIF 1.0 was however 
criticized by the proprietary software lobby (BSA) during the consultation 
for the EIF 2.0 version resulting in the removal of the RF requirement and 
the promotion of open-source in the official version. The 2.0 version was 
also published without a clear definition of what is to be considered “open” 
as to not give preference to a specific licensing approach.
85
  
 
Many from the public as well as the software industry have since then 
claimed that IDABC focused too much attention to the views of the BSA 
and disregarded the open-source community and thus neglecting 
interoperability in order to promote political aims.
86
 One of the most 
prominent defenders of RF requirements in these discussions has been 
ECIS, who in an open statement supported the definition in EIF 1.0 in that 
“to be fully open, a software interoperability specification may not be 
encumbered with running intellectual property royalties, and that where 
equivalent functionality is provided by a specification that does not require 
payment of IPR royalties to implement, that specification is more open and 
should be favored, while not precluding public administrations from 
choosing whichever technical solution they please”.87  
 
A perhaps even stronger supporter of RF standards as optimal in creating 
interoperability is the European Commission Vice-President for the Digital 
Agenda, Neelie Kroes who have stated;  
 
“Let's imagine two competing standards that are both technically excellent 
for a certain task but differ in the level of constraints for implementers. 
Which of these two standards do you think will see more implementation 
                                                 
82 See Tim Berners-Lee (2010) “Long Live the Web: A Call for Continued Open Standards and Neutrality”  
83 Interoperable Delivery of European eGovernment Services to public Administrations, Businesses and Citizens 
(IDABC) 
84 EIF version 1.0 page 9  
85 See EIF version 2.0  
86 See e.g. H Roy, K Gerloff (2010) “EIFv2: Tracking the loss of interoperability” and ECIS (2010) “ECIS 
Statement on the proposed new European Interoperability Framework” 
87 ECIS (2010) “ECIS Statement on the proposed new European Interoperability Framework”  
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and use, including for unforeseen purposes? The one that you can download 
from a website and that you can implement without restrictions? Or the 
other one which you have to buy, which is restricted to certain fields of use 
and which requires royalty payments for embodied intellectual property 
rights (IPR)? The answer is obvious. And that is why everybody who cares 
about interoperability should care about the financial conditions for the use 
of standards as well as the indirect constraints imposed on third parties: the 
fewer constraints the better”.88 
 
Even though the EIF 2.0 does not include a preference for RF and open-
source as in the 1.0 version, it puts the main focuses on “openness” as the 
key to enable interoperability, even though the explanation given for the 
term is rather vague.
89
 The reasoning behind including the FRAND option 
was to give incentive to innovate and to make all technology available to the 
standard, with or without royalty, in line with the opinions of the BSA. This 
can seem rather strange since defining openness in a recommendation could 
hardly be considered excluding other technologies, and if a technology is 
more or less “open” interoperability wise, should that not be defined without 
regards to potential financial incentives of innovation? Would the ideal 
situation regarding openness of a standard not be that all who want to 
implement the standard is able to do so? Well in so far as some royalty rates 
might be too high to allow some potential implementers to access the 
technology in the standard, it would not live up to this ideal,
90
 thus making 
standards requiring royalty payments less “open”, in line with the opinion 
represented in EIF 1.0.  
 
When it comes to openness and software, it might be difficult finding or 
even imagining a better model than open-source, as the name implies it has 
openness as its core. The open-source license is e.g. not allowed to put 
restrictions on other software distributed along with the open-source 
software as well as being technology neutral by default. This along with the 
already stated characteristics of open-source licenses always renders the 
software “fully open” (EIF1.0) and interoperable with other software 
whether it is a part of a standard or not.
91
 These qualities also reduce the risk 
of lock-in situations occurring when using open-source and lock-in 
generally occurs when the consumer seeks to switch from proprietary 
software to an open-source alternative.
92
 The positive effect that open-
source have on lock-in is confirmed by the Swedish Competition Authority 
that after conducting research on the matter is recommending a prioritizing 
of open-source over proprietary software in order to minimize the risk of 
lock-in.
93
 Avoiding lock-in have also been the number one technical 
objective for the public authorities that switched from proprietary to open-
                                                 
88 Quote: N Kroes from speech “How to get more interoperability in Europe” page 3 
89 See EIF version 2.0 § 2.1  
90 M MacCarthy (2009)    
91 See definition of open source, http://opensource.org/osd-annotated 
92 C Mair (2012) 
93 R Wessman (2013) ”Upphandling av IT- inlåsningseffekter och möjligheter”(E-procurement- lock in effects and 
possibilities)  
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source software, and that objective have in the clear majority of cases been 
successfully realized.
94
  
 
Research has also shown that in a competitive market between open-source 
and proprietary software, when in a dominant the proprietary company will 
make more profit and have a bigger market share if it remains incompatible 
with the open-source competitor. The open-source software on the other 
hand would in a similar situation benefit from being compatible with the 
competitor due to the benefits from network effects. Meaning that when in a 
dominant position there is more incentive for open-source software to make 
itself compatible than for a proprietary alternative.
95
 This can be seen for 
example on the “office suite” market, where the dominant proprietary 
software MS Office has been reluctant to make itself compatible with the 
open-source alternative.
96
   
 
Several European countries have after research recognized these beneficial 
properties and developed policies to promote open-source by prioritizing it 
over other software in public procurement with the objective of enhance 
interoperability, Holland and the UK to name a few.
97
 Other countries such 
as Sweden have taken a similar approach but instead of referencing to open-
source have used the open standard definition in EIF 1.0 declaring RF 
standards as first choice in public e-procurement to avoid lock-in and 
vendor dependence.
98
 Some countries outside of Europe have even gone so 
far as to completely ban royalty baring software from public procurement of 
interoperability standards.
99
 
  
4.1.4 Other Efficiencies  
 
Another efficiency gain would be to make technology available to the 
consumer quicker than would otherwise be the case, which could also be 
explained as strict efficiency or time efficiencies. Technology can become 
available later than necessary because of difficulties in the standardization 
process as well as hold ups regarding the technological availability. In both 
these situations there are some differences between using technology that is 
subject to royalty payments and technology that is available on RF basis. 
  
In the standard setting process RF have some benefits over FRAND 
regarding effectiveness in the strict sense. Even though the scope of 
FRAND is to resolve or facilitate patent issues and royalty discussions, that 
                                                 
94 M Shaikh, T Cornford (2011) 
95 See K Cheng, Y Liu, Tang (2011) “The Impact of Network Externalities on the Competition Between Open 
Source and Proprietary Software” and J-M Dalle (2001) 
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is not always the result since one of the problems with FRAND is that there 
is not a clear definition as to what FRAND de facto means in any given 
situation. This often results in a royalty negotiation process that in many 
cases causes hold ups and delays the implementation of the standard.
100
 That 
problem would not occur in a RF situation because of the specificity, 
transparency and certainty that RF brings to the process, which eliminates 
the risk of hold ups. Since the royalty question is already settled there will 
be no negotiation. Even though the RF approach would not eliminate the 
risk of patent litigation, it decreases it as well as reduces risk of companies 
“finding” a patent included in the standard after the standard has been set 
which is an advantage since that phenomena occurs in standardization from 
time to time and can cause serious problems.
101
   
 
Regarding the technological aspect of time efficiencies the difference 
between incentives for open-source and proprietary software plays a 
significant role, at least theoretically. Proprietary software producers get 
incentives to release improved versions only from time to time, so that users 
are obliged to regularly buy newer versions. Proprietary software producers 
thus have the incentive to wait for improvements to be sufficient to support 
the release of a new version, in order to optimize profit. Open-source 
software on the other hand is very regularly delivered to users through the 
release of successive versions which add new functionalities and correct 
bugs and add minor improvements. As a consequence, open-source software 
is also “continuously” more efficient than proprietary software.102 
Authorities in the UK have after changing to open-source based solutions 
experienced an astounding improvement in response time for queries and 
bug fixes in comparison to using proprietary software because of these 
reasons.
103
 But this also depends on which software is being used, since 
open-source software with few competent users will be less effective than 
one with more users who have the skills to make upgrades and 
developments and the will to make them available.                              
               
 
 
4.2 Second Condition  
 
4.2.1 “Fair Share for Consumer”  
 
The second condition that needs to be fulfilled according to Article 101(3) 
TFEU is that the consumer must receive their fair share of the efficiencies 
generated by the restriction. So who is to be considered a “consumer” and 
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what is to be considered a “fair share”? According to the Guidelines, a 
consumer is anyone who directly or indirectly uses the products covered by 
the agreement or as in this case the provision.
104
  Considering that the 
present discussion is regarding public procurement the term “consumer” 
will include the entire chain from the State to the authorities responsible for 
the procurement, but also other potential users of the ICT systems such as 
citizens in the extent they come into contact with the procured software. As 
to what is considered as a “fair share” it follows from the Guidelines that at 
the very least all actual or likely negative effect stemming from the 
restriction must be compensated for. So the bare minimum is that the overall 
effects are producing a neutral result from the consumer’s perspective while 
of course more positive than negative effects are to be desired.
105
   
 
Consumers are to be seen as a whole and not individuals when considering 
the overall effect of the restriction meaning that ever single consumer does 
not have to gain from the efficiencies, and neither is it necessary that 
consumers benefit from every efficiency stemming from the restriction, but 
as said, the overall picture is what is to be considered. So it is necessary to 
recognize the advantages as well as the disadvantages of a RF requirement 
in order to properly assess if the consumers are receiving their fair share or 
not.
106
  
 
When it comes to public procurement, the consumer benefits are perhaps the 
most important factor of all, since the objective of Article 13 is to improve 
and facilitate ICT procurement for the member States, as to make them 
more interoperable and efficient regarding cost and resources, and not to 
benefit certain types of companies of software. In other words, it is in this 
section that the efficiencies must be most prolific and if the consumers are 
not gaining from a potential RF requirement, there would not be much sense 
in having such a requirement, even if the result would be neutral. The 
efficiencies covered in the last chapter are of course all of them positive for 
the consumer  for various reasons, but I have chosen to separate the 
efficiencies that stems directly from the production or development of the 
software and have thus discussed them in the last chapter. Here in this 
chapter the focus will be on the efficiencies and benefits that come from the 
actual use of RF and open-source software for public authorities. The 
economical efficiencies will be discussed in this chapter since the more 
important benefits in that regard are to be made on the consumer side, while 
the interoperability aspect will be discussed here as well, but from the 
consumer perspective. It seems natural to do so in considering both the 
nature of public procurement and the importance of the consumer in this 
situation but also because of the nature of RF software and the efficiencies 
that it brings.  
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This evaluation of potential benefits and detriments for the consumer will to 
a large extent be a discussion about open-source and proprietary software 
because of their respective close relationships with RF and FRAND, and 
also since that is to a large extent how the market is represented when it 
comes to public procurement. More often than not the choice of the procurer 
is between a Microsoft OS and a Linux distribution or MS Office and 
OpenOffice or LibreOffice when it comes to office suites alternatives.
107
 
 
There are several reasons for public authorities to choose RF software. The 
more obvious reason would be to save money by not paying royalties and 
licensing fees, but the technological advantages might in some cases be even 
more desirable, depending on the point of view. This discussion will first 
deal with the technological benefits followed by the economical. 
 
4.2.2 Technological Benefit for Consumer 
 
Open-source has gained its increased popularity among companies because 
it is cheaper, less vulnerable to viruses or other rogue programs, more 
reliable and scalable, and most important, enables users to adapt the 
software to their needs with full access to the source code.
108
 Even though 
these factors play a part in public procurement, research has shown that the 
most important factor for authorities when migrating from proprietary to 
open-source software is to avoid lock-in,
109
 since with a proprietary product 
the risks of lock-in is greater while the number of suppliers are lesser and 
thus consequently increasing the dependence on the supplier. Earlier this 
year for example Microsoft discontinued the support for their OS Windows 
XP
110
 even though it was and still is the second most used OS in the 
world
111
, thus forcing users to migrate their software, since the option of 
creating support outside the supplier were non-existing. Authorities 
migrating to open-source sees the advantages with the possibilities to 
choose from a larger number of vendors and a more flexible and accessible 
support with the possibility of creating in-house support as well as an 
increase in vendor options. This leads to the conclusion that there are some 
clear benefits to be gained for public authorities in changing from 
proprietary to open-source software, at least theoretically. But how does that 
translate in reality, since there are many variables and difficulties to 
overcome in successfully complete an IT migration, theory and practice 
does not necessarily match. 
 
Since the open-source movement is relatively young and the proprietary 
market is rather limited, consisting largely of different Microsoft products to 
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choose from, there are not many large scale software migrations to study. 
But fortunately there are some. 
 
The first open-source investment by a public authority of a significant 
magnitude was the ten year long project to migrate the city of Munich’s 
administration from a vendor locked proprietary IT structure to a free and 
more flexible Linux based solution.
112
 The reason behind the migration was 
Microsoft’s decision to discontinue support for the Windows NT 4.0 OS, the 
discontinuance of support as mentioned being one of the more common 
reasons for software migration. This forced the city to make a choice 
between migrating to a newer Windows platform, no doubt the easier 
choice, or to try something new and go for the open-source alternative. After 
a long period of researching and preparing they decided on the latter of the 
two alternatives.  
 
For this purpose they constructed their own Linux distribution called 
“LiMux”(Linux and Munich together) that functions as the OS and 
backbone of the new system and using first OpenOffice but later changing 
to LibreOffice as the primary productivity software with MS Office being 
the product used before the migration. The LiMux project includes a Linux 
Basis Client with automated deployment and configuration management 
office software adapted for team working on Linux and Windows clients 
WollMux, a template and form manager necessary server components for 
the first three items who together basically are supposed to cover all IT 
needs of the city. In 2013 they had successfully migrated 15 000 computers 
of public employees to open-source software.
113
 After 10 years the project 
was completed, and even though it took longer than originally expected the 
city officials where more than pleased with the project and its results.  
 
The successful IT migration have according to the municipality itself 
contributed not only to saving millions of Euros but also an extraordinaire 
level of independence from vendors, independence in its operating system, a 
high level of IT security and because LiMux is free and open they can share 
it free of cost with the citizens of the town as well as with other 
municipalities who would want to use it.
114
 One important factor that has to 
be considered is the size and difficulty level of the project and the people 
responsible made no secret about the fact that it in no way had been a 
problem free or easy endeavor and that there is a need for careful planning, 
high level competence and positive government support for something like 
this to succeed.  
 
What can be concluded from the LiMux project is that it is possible even for 
a big city
115
 to essentially be entirely based on open-source with beneficial 
results, but it does not come easy. 
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More common than the example of a whole Municipality migrating to open-
source as was the case in Munich is when a single department with a less 
complex IT structure decides to switch from proprietary to open-source.
116
 
A case study was made about when the Swedish Police Department made 
just such a migration. The motivation in their case was the need to save 
money due to stricter budget demands, and after researching the situation 
the resulting opinion was that the most beneficial option available to them 
would be to migrate to open-source and more particularly to Linux and 
JBoss.
117
 Based on the situation and their research they expected to reduce 
cost not only by avoiding licensing fees but also from an increased number 
of potential vendors, which would lower the prices, seeing as lock-in was 
the biggest financial problem.
118
  
 
Unlike the Munich example the plan of the Swedish Police was not to use 
exclusively open-source software but to only change the software related to 
the servers and the hardware, with the employee desktops still running on 
proprietary software.
119
 This shows that there are different levels of 
migration that can be made and authorities can choose to be more or less 
intrusive in the works of regular employees when migrating to open-source, 
and in the case of the Swedish Police the system changes where basically 
limited to the competences of the IT department. Even though they 
conducted a smaller scale IT migration in comparison to Munich, the 
Swedish Police were adamant about the difficulties they faced and great 
emphasis and investment was made on preparations and education for the IT 
staff before the change.  
 
Thanks to these preparations they succeeded in realizing all the calculated 
benefits of switching to open-source, such as vendor independence and 
increased cost efficiency. But there were also some more unexpected 
benefits. For example, with the new IT platform, the software uses less of 
the system’s resources leading to a performance increase sometimes as great 
as ten times that of the previous platform.
120
 Because of the open format 
they also had it easier finding developers and support for the new solutions 
through the open-source community. But even more important was the 
opportunity to build real expertise within the department, seeing as 70% of 
their ICT is developed in-house, the importance of being able to resolve 
occurring problems quickly without the need of outside assistance is 
essential.
121
 
 
 Looking not only to these two examples, but to a large number of 
authorities that migrated to open-source the pattern appears to be that the 
potential benefits of open-source in reality are very much realizable if done 
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correctly. Most authorities using open-source have experienced a higher 
level of vendor independence and reduced lock-in which has been the 
number one reason for migrating after saving cost, which is intertwined with 
the reduction of lock-in.
122
  
 
The fact that the most prioritized aspects of open-source have been 
successfully realized should not be surprising due to the nature of the 
software and the research that was made by the relevant authorities 
beforehand. What is maybe not surprising but at least more reassuring for 
authorities or companies considering open-source as an alternative are that 
in most cases the users seem to also experience a more efficient and 
accessible support and update system due to the open-source community.
123
 
That was a concern for many authorities before migration since the software 
updates and services to a large extent depends on the open-source 
community which because of its voluntary nature could have been seen as 
less dependable; fortunately that has not been the case.  
 
Another perhaps more expected advantage that authorities as well as 
companies using open-source have experienced is regarding development. 
When it comes to quality, flexibility and agility of development there seem 
to be benefits to gain due to the freedom and openness of the open-source 
platform since there is no need to wait for updates or do them yourself when 
they more often than not can be found available within the community. 
Accessing new software is also more efficient since the decision process is 
not needed when the software is downloadable for free along with 
updates.
124
 
 
The freedom to change, expand or build upon the already existing software 
has in many cases been a great success both in the private and public sector 
rendering open-source a more efficient and flexible choice for authorities 
with the right competence.
125
 Even though not being one of the more 
prioritized qualities of open-source according to the research, the possibility 
to share the software and take part in its development has also had positive 
effects. There are examples of authorities becoming part of important open-
source software communities and others where citizens have gotten 
involved and contribute to becoming a part of the platform co-operation.
126
 
As a result of, many authorities that completed the IT migration are of the 
opinion that open-source is more able than proprietary software to in the 
long run provide the types of systems and services that the public sector 
needs, and in the way that would be best suited for public interest.
127
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4.2.3 Economic Benefit  for Consumer 
 
When it comes to consumers, costs, royalties and standards, the first thing to 
consider is that the existence of a royalty will automatically increase the 
costs of all products related to the standard, decreasing the size of the 
standards network, thus decreasing the potential consumer benefits 
associated with that standard.
128
 Hence from a strict cost aspect it would be 
more beneficial for consumers if the technologies in standards are not 
subject to royalty payments. The possibility of reducing cost is also the most 
important factor when migrating to open-source, at least from a policy 
standpoint. The most attractive feature of RF and open-source software 
regarding cost is the lack of royalty and licensing fees, but there are also 
possibilities to save money due to efficiency gains such as enhanced 
interoperability leading to an increased number of vendors. There is 
however a need to investigate how those possibilities translates in reality, 
and the overall picture, since there are other costs to consider besides 
acquisition and licensing of the software. 
 
There are many different reasons as to why change from proprietary to 
open-source, but lowering costs is almost always one of them. There are 
also different scales of migration as we have seen and they have different 
impacts on costs.  
 
In Finland, the Ministry of Justice changed their office suite from MS Office 
to OpenOffice when having to migrate due to a change in operative systems 
from Windows NT 4 to Windows XP. A decision made solely on financial 
grounds.
129
 The results of the project showed that over a five year period the 
migration to the open-source alternative would overall cost less than half of 
the proprietary alternative (MS Office), even though some expenses such as 
staff training would be higher with OpenOffice.
130
 The example set by the 
Finnish authorities demonstrates that a “smaller” size migration can be very 
cost effective due to only cutting licensing and maintenance costs.  
 
So what about larger scale projects? 
 
Well in both examples of Munich and the Swedish Police the migrations 
where successful in cutting costs, with Munich saving 11 million Euro on 
the migration alone
131
 and the Swedish police saving 19 million Euro over 
the years 2006-2011, a reduction close to fifty percent in comparison to the 
proprietary alternative.
132
 That could be considered quite an 
accomplishment when considering that Munich developed an entire system 
running on a Linux distribution that they themselves constructed, which was 
far from cheap.  
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What is interesting in the cases where the migration is covering more than a 
single software program is that there seem to be more ways to save money 
with open-source than just from the more obvious acquisition, licensing and 
maintenance. One of the benefits that come with increased vendor 
independence is an increase in competition between vendors and thus lower 
prices, which in the long run becomes an important factor in cost 
reduction.
133
 Another perhaps less obvious advantage of using open-source 
software is the hardware. Or rather the increased interoperability with 
hardware that comes with using Linux. That became an important factor 
both for the Swedish Police that was able to buy cheaper hardware and 
Munich that could continue using their old hardware, which would not have 
been possible if migrating to the Windows alternative.
134
 Authorities have 
also been able to cut costs through increase in operational effectiveness 
stemming from the migration such as greater transparency and audit-ability 
which allows more informed decisions to be made about systems over time, 
indicating that using open-source can also lead to more subtle benefits that 
over time keep reducing cost.
135
  
 
An IT migration is an expensive endeavor and even though it seems to be 
cheaper migrating to open-source than proprietary software due to fewer 
costs and higher interoperability, the fact that it is expensive does not 
change.
136
 One thing that constantly seems to be more expensive with 
migrating to open-source is the in-house training that is needed to use the 
software, which is quite natural considering that education normally is 
needed with the use of unfamiliar software. Costs related to staff education 
could also be considered as investment as it raises competence within the 
department which when using open-source seems to be extra beneficial and 
helps safe money over time.
137
 This leads to the consensus among users that 
an open-source migration should only be done when necessary and should 
not be done carelessly. So from a cost perspective, the saying “if it is not 
broke don’t fix it” seems to be quite appropriate in this situation, implying 
that migrating to open-source when the migration is not necessary should 
not be recommended.
138
 But when the migration is indeed needed the open-
source solution seems to be the most cost efficient when appropriate. This is 
supported by research showing that essentially all authorities using open-
source have according to their experiences reduced costs in several ways.
139
 
 
Another positive economic effect that can arguably be attributed to open-
source is that it can nurture and build up strength in local supplier 
companies and support economic growth. Since the support, maintenance 
and development market for open-source is accessible for anyone it provides 
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the opportunity for local business to play part. In Spain and Brazil for 
example the national software industries have according to the countries 
themselves flourished because of the use of open-source, creating a larger 
base of SMEs as a result.
140
 Considering that the State is the consumer in 
public procurement, stimulating the national economy is to be seen as a 
consumer benefit and in this case also have a positive effect on competition 
in general. 
 
4.2.4 Benefits vs Deficits  
 
There seem to be some clear benefits for consumers if properly using RF 
and open-source software based on the research earlier presented in this 
chapter. For the second condition in 101(3) TFEU to be fulfilled however, 
these benefits must outweigh or at least nullify the negative effects that the 
restriction can cause the consumers, the restriction in this case being a RF 
requirement in Article 13. 
 
There are many benefits to using open-source when done correctly, but at 
the same time it is not something easy to do and there are no indications 
suggesting that it would be the ideal solution for every authority or situation. 
Practically every authority that migrated to open-source confirms that it 
takes research and preparations as well as a competent IT department to be 
successful. There are also examples of failed or less successful open-source 
projects by authorities due to lack of planning or deficient competence 
within the departments.
141
 Different products are also more or less suitable 
for open-source as a public procurement alternative, regarding server 
software it seems very advantageous and not especially unsafe while using 
open-source for desktops is considered difficult and quite unpractical since 
it would be very demanding for the user, which is indicated by the market 
share of less than two percent for open-source desktop OS.
142
 There are also 
areas where proprietary software is simply better and more tailored for 
certain demands that need to be fulfilled by the authority using the 
product.
143
 Considering this, it would be safe to assume that a RF 
requirement for all public procurement would not be the most effective 
solution. Especially considering that some municipalities and public bodies 
are smaller than others and cannot reasonably be expected to conduct 
advanced IT migrations with all the risks that it involves. A more suitable 
situation would be that the public procurers themselves after examining 
their option are freely able to make the choice that best suits their situation. 
  
                                                 
140 M, Shaikh, T Cornford (2011) pages 30 in general and page 25 for the example of the Andaluisan government 
in Spain 
141 See e.g. https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/elibrary/case/lessons-learned-greek-open-source-project and “One German 
city drops Openoffice for MS office, why Open Source still fails to impress” 
142 M Shaikh, T Cornford (2011) page 24 and http://www.netmarketshare.com/operating-system-market-
share.aspx?qprid=10&qpcustomd=0 for statistic of market shares on the OS market 
143 See D Wlodarz and  M Shaikh, T Cornford (2011) 
 35 
So with that in mind we need to see what the scope of Article 13 is and how 
it may affect the consumers. The provision states that “the Commission may 
decide to identify ICT technical specifications that are not national, which 
may be referenced, primarily to enable interoperability, in public 
procurement”.144 
 
The objective is to identify standards that “may be referenced” to enable 
interoperability. So there is nothing in Article 13 forcing or limiting the 
choices available to the procurer. The objective rather seems to be helping 
procurer make choices to enable interoperability, and looking at the 
technical specifications that the Commission have “standardized” so far 
according to Article 13 the conclusion can be made that the standards are to 
cover more general interoperability network aspects, and not more intrusive 
software such as for example specifying operative systems or office suite 
software.
145
  
 
So the question is then; how much would consumers be affected of the 
possible RF requirement?  
 
There are some companies that might avoid taking part in the 
standardization process due to the lack of royalty incentive. That may lead 
to technology being left out of the standard, possibly even technology that 
could have been of use to the consumers using the standard when procuring. 
There is also the incentive to innovate question that has already been 
discussed in this thesis and a negative effect on innovation would also be 
negative for the consumer, but that works both ways so if innovation is 
positively affected as it seems to be, it would be beneficial to the consumer. 
Considering that proprietary software is almost always better known and 
more used among procurers than open-source alternatives, the risk of a 
proprietary technology not being utilized in a way that would hurt the 
consumer could be considered relatively limited when regarding a voluntary 
recommendation.  
 
At the same time, the inclusion of a RF requirement would not 
automatically mean that all positive effects of RF and open-source software 
will be realized by the authorities. But looking at the research there clearly 
are several positive effects that can come from increased use of open-source 
software by authorities in the Member States. Open-source software 
however, remains underutilized because of the low level of knowledge 
regarding its existence and the clear advantage proprietary software has due 
to brand recognition and previous use. Another factor is that many 
responsible within the public sector rather “plays it safe” and continues with 
the more known products than tries something like open-source that would 
be considered a more risky approach.
146
 This leads to the argument 
supported by researchers as well as policy makers, that there is a need for 
policy initiatives to level the playing field for open-source to be accessed 
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properly due to the advantages that proprietary software at the moment 
enjoys when it comes to public ICT procurement.
147
 
 
What is quite clear when researching open-source projects is that even 
though there are several good examples to be found, the reality is that only a 
small percentage of public authorities in the EU are using open source, 
which also makes it more difficult and more hazardous for procurers to 
make the decision to use open-source instead of the leading proprietary 
product. Arguably implying that recommendations from EU provisions to 
use RF open-source software in standards would not create barriers for 
proprietary software and thus limiting the choices of the procurer but instead 
rendering the playing field more balanced and assisting procurers in making 
the choice to access open-source in situations where it might be profitable 
but at the same time the more difficult decision to make.  
    
        
 
        
         
      
  
4.3 Third Condition     
     
4.3.1 Indispensability 
 
The third condition that needs to be met according to Article 101(3) TFEU 
is “to not impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not 
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives”.148 
 
Meaning in the situation at hand that the restriction of not allowing royalty 
based technology to be part of the standards set in accordance with Article 
13 have to be essential to the fulfillment of the efficiencies and the 
consumer benefits earlier discussed in this thesis. What is to be seen as 
“indispensable” is however less clear from the wording in the article so to 
find the correct interpretation to that phrasing the Guidelines need to be 
consulted. From the Guidelines it follows that;  
 
“the decisive factor is whether or not the restrictive agreement and 
individual restrictions make it possible to perform the activity in question 
more efficiently than would likely have been the case in the absence of the 
agreement or the restriction concerned. The question is not whether in the 
absence of the restriction the agreement would not have been concluded, 
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but whether more efficiencies are produced with the agreement or 
restriction than in the absence of the agreement or restriction”.149 So it is 
rather a question of if the efficiencies and positive effects would be lesser or 
harder to achieve without the restriction than whether the restriction is 
necessary to make the efficiencies possible.  
 
As concluded earlier in this thesis there might well be several benefits in 
using RF and open-source software, but would a RF requirement in Article 
13 be necessary to fully take advantage of those benefits?  
 
4.3.2 GPL License Issue  
 
The key aspect of this discussion concerns the different licenses used by 
open-source software and their compatibility with FRAND.  
There are around 70 different licenses recognized by the Open-source 
Initiative as open-source licenses.
150
 All with different characteristics 
tailored to fit the needs, ideas and ideals of the creator of the license who in 
many cases is also the manufacturer of the software. Regarding the vast 
majority of these licenses such as restrictive and hybrid licenses there are 
generally no provisions disturbing the possible compatibility with 
FRAND.
151
 When it comes to permissive licenses however we find some 
problems and this first and foremost regarding the incompatibility between 
FRAND and GNU General Public Licenses (GPL) who based on their core 
ideals and architecture are difficult to combine with royalties to say the 
least.  
 
How the GPL licenses works is basically that they give rights to the user 
rather than protect the rights of the original IPR holder and these rights 
automatically follows the chain of users in cascade like fashion as to 
guarantee the freedoms granted to users not only of the original software but 
also to the users of derivative products of the original software.
152
 
 
This architecture is fundamental to the objective and ideal of the GPL 
licenses and can clearly be seen in clause six of the GPLv2 that stipulates: 
 
 “Each time you redistribute the Program (or any work based on the 
Program), the recipient automatically receives a license from the original 
licensor to copy, distribute or modify the Program subject to these terms 
and conditions. You may not impose any further restrictions on the 
recipients' exercise of the rights granted herein. You are not responsible for 
enforcing compliance by third parties to this License”.153 
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That in relationship with clause two b):  
 
“You must cause any work that you distribute or publish, that in whole or in 
part contains or is derived from the Program or any part thereof, to be 
licensed as a whole at no charge to all third parties under the terms of this 
License.” 154 Demonstrates the difficulty in combining software under 
GPLv2 license with any software for which royalties are to be paid and if 
the wording of clause two b) was not clear enough, clause seven clarifies:  
 
“For example, if a patent license would not permit royalty free 
redistribution of the Program by all those who receive copies directly or 
indirectly through you, then the only way that you could satisfy both it and 
this License would be to refrain entirely from distribution of the program.” 
This provision has been given the nick-name the “liberty or death” clause 
since it solidifies that no restriction of the original freedoms is allowed or 
else the program is impossible to distribute.  
 
The latest GPL version, the GPLv3 has similar provisions that are even 
more tailored to hinder interoperability with FRAND to rectify some ways 
found to circumvent the GPLv2 license, and states inter alia “To prevent 
this, the GPL assures that patents cannot be used to render the program 
non-free”.155 
 
The GPLv2 version however is the more used of the licenses and could be 
deemed more important.
156
 Another thing worth noting is that the GPL 
licenses have no clause related to governing law or legal jurisdiction. So the 
exact interpretation of the wording in these clauses might well vary 
depending on the court and jurisdiction in any given legal process. It must 
however be considered highly unlikely that any court within the EU would 
consider the GPL licenses compatible with royalty payments.
157
  
 
So what this means is for example that if an authority implements a FRAND 
standard that is subject to royalty payments and already has software or code 
licensed under a GPL license that they want to combine with the standard, 
the product of that combination would not be allowed to be redistributed, 
since the rights of the GPL would not be passed on to the next user.
158
  
 
The GPL licenses are as stated above just a few among many others open-
source licenses, so does incompatibility with GPL really merit a RF 
requirement? Well the problem is that even though the GPL family 
represents a small part of the licenses they cover the majority of the open-
source projects, around 60%.
159
 The most prominent among the open-source 
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projects covered by these licenses is the Linux kernel, meaning that Linux, 
arguably the most important software for public procurement is 
incompatible with any standard that is subject to royalty payments.
160
 In fact 
even a FRAND-Z (without royalties) would likely be difficult to combine 
with the GPLv2 because of the difference in architecture depending on how 
the court would interpret the license in the given case.
161
  
 
Considering the quantity and importance of open-source software covered 
by GPL licenses the choice to include FRAND in the Horizontal Guidelines, 
EIF 2.0 and Article 13 constitutes a genuine problem. A problem that 
unfortunately seems difficult to resolve due to the fundamental 
incompatibility that lies in the architecture of two licensing models, with 
GPL licenses having a cascade effect where granting the first licensee the 
first license the original IPR owner does nothing further since subsequent 
licenses will be granted automatically. When it comes to FRAND on the 
other hand, the IPR owner will have to grant a new individual license to 
each new licensee. And to make sure that the software remains “free” the 
GPL requires that the patent license conforms to the GPL architecture which 
a royalty baring patent impossibly can do without removing the royalty.
162
  
 
Because of this compatibility issue between FRAND and GPL licensed 
software the argument could be made, that if the objective is to utilize open-
source in interoperability standards as to reap the benefits earlier stated in 
this thesis, then the possibility to use open-source projects covered by the 
GPL license cannot not be eliminated. Since these projects are incompatible 
with royalty bearing technology, the technology chosen as interoperability 
standards would have to be free of royalties to fully realize the potential 
benefits.  
 
This licensing issue and the need for technology to be RF in order to be 
compatible with the majority of open-source software is also one of the 
major reasons why open-source and RF are so intertwined and in some areas 
of this discussion inseparable. 
 
This clash between license forms also represents a major hindrance when it 
comes to interoperability, which I chose to discuss here considering the 
need for background information regarding the different licensing forms. 
The fact that the majority of open-source projects are not compatible with 
patents subjected to royalty payments is also raising criticism of the explicit 
inclusion of FRAND in EIF 2.0 with the motivation to not exclude royalties 
from their definition of “open”.163 
 
The reasoning behind the choice to include both FRAND and RF in the EIF 
2.0 was to enable interoperability, give incentive to innovate and to create a 
level playing field between proprietary and open-source software.
164
This 
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might seem reasonable at first glance since a level playing field should mean 
that as many different software as possible are eligible as options for the 
standard, but how does the inclusion of FRAND translate in reality?  
 
The inclusion of patents subject to royalty payments excludes 
interoperability with most open-source software and therefore the argument 
has been made that the very inclusion of FRAND in EIF 2.0 has a negative 
impact first of all on interoperability but also on open-source projects 
covered by the GPL licenses who consequently are put in a disadvantageous 
position and thus rendering the playing field uneven. The EIF is not legally 
binding and can therefore not be legally enforced, but is however a 
communication with the force of the Commission behind it and as such it 
carries a lot of weight within the EU, and rightfully so. So proclaiming that 
FRAND is the best way to create interoperability could possibly be 
damaging not only to open-source and interoperability but to competition as 
well.
165
  
 
To the contrary of the views presented in EIF 2.0, there is a commonly 
shared perception that if open-source is to become an accepted and 
substantial part of information systems activity within the public sector 
which would be necessary for realizing the efficiencies earlier discussed. 
Then there is a need for government-level policies to sustain the change 
including an overhaul of procurement processes and practices. Most see this 
as an essential leveling of the playing field, hence the same objective as in 
EIF 2.0 but with almost the opposite method.
166
 Several authorities using 
open-source as well as policy makers are of the opinion that to create a 
situation where it would be as easy for an authority to procure open-source 
as proprietary software policies need to benefit open-source because it is the 
more difficult choice to make as it currently stands.  
 
The lack of other authorities using open-source has been one of the biggest 
problems in successfully migrating to open-source in many cases, and has 
even forced authorities to go back on their own open-source projects despite 
having the official support of the government.
167
 These difficulties were 
experienced by the Municipality of Munich as well as the Swedish Police 
that both expressed described the lack of other similar projects that they 
could look to for guidance as one of the biggest obstacles in the realization 
of open-source projects.
168
 This implies that if it were easier to access open-
source then more authorities would use it which consequently would make it 
easier for other authorities to follow suite, while simultaneously increasing 
the positive network effects making it more beneficial for new and former 
users alike. One and arguably the best way in realizing this facilitation 
would be through policy changes, such as mandating technology to be RF if 
to be included in interoperability standards.  
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When considering the need for positive reinforcement from policies in order 
to maximize the efficiencies described in earlier chapters, including a RF 
requirement in Article 13 would make a lot of sense. The inclusion of 
FRAND could on the other hand be seen as less favorable to the majority of 
open-source projects, putting them at a disadvantage and thus making the 
potential benefits described of open-source substantially more difficult to 
realize. 
 
4.3.3 Efficiency of the Standard 
 
For the potential benefits to be realized, the standards themselves have to be 
utilized effectively and as broadly as possible. Therefore the standards 
accepted according to Article 13 should preferably be as applicable as 
possible for the national or local procurers. The aspirations of EU 
standardization is that “It should become possible to use these standards in 
public procurement or to facilitate policy making and legislation”,169 so 
choosing technology for the standard that everyone in the Union can use for 
procurement with as few problems as possible should be a priority when 
setting standards in accordance with Article 13.   
 
Several Member States have after research found RF and open-source 
software beneficial as well as underused.
170
 Because of the apparent need 
for government initiatives to facilitate an increased utilization of open-
source, several States have adopted procurement policies to do so. This has 
been differently in various Member States. Some policies states that open-
source must always be looked at and considered as an option, others include 
a clear preference for open-source when of equal or of higher quality than 
proprietary options.
171
 Some are stricter in their preference; the Italian 
“Codice dell’amministrazione digitale” even states that;   
 
Only where a comparative assessment of technical and economic sort has 
been made, that according to the criteria referred to in paragraph 1-bis 
justifiably proves the impossibility to access solutions already available 
within the public administration, or free software or open-source codes 
adapted to the needs of the situation, is the acquisition of proprietary 
computer programs allowed.
172
 Constituting one of the clearest pro free 
software policies in national legislation.  
 
It is interesting to see the motivation behind the different national policies, 
where the reasoning behind the Italian law seem mostly financial, other ones 
such as the Swedish and Dutch seem to be more driven by the technological 
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advantages, such as to reduce lock-in and increase interoperability and 
innovation. So essentially all efficiencies discussed in this thesis has been 
recognized by different policy makers in the Member States. 
  
The national policies adopted to facilitate the use of free or open-source 
software shows a clear trend in ICT procurement from the Member States 
nationally, which could create a problem in relation to Union ICT standards 
to the extent that they demand the payment of royalties. This conclusion can 
be drawn from the earlier discussion regarding the license issue between 
GPL and royalty payments. 
 
As seen above, if standards recommended in accordance with Article 13 
would include technology that are subject to royalty payments they would 
not be compatible with the majority of open-source projects which by itself 
is a significant problem. But considering the national policies of the 
Member States there is also a problem related to the compatibility between 
the different policies since an authority procuring IT under a national policy 
that prioritizes free software will most likely to some extent use software 
covered by GPL licenses. They would therefore not be able to combine the 
code or software that they are using with the standard. Having standards that 
are not free of royalties would also as in cases of the Italian “Codice 
digitale” mean that procurers are not allowed to use the standard unless 
impossible to use other prioritized alternatives, and would render such a 
standard difficult if not impossible to implement in these situations. Even in 
cases with less strict national policy, a standard subjected to patent royalties 
would be very difficult to combine with the policies encouraging the use of 
RF and/or open-source software. That would likely cause the standard to be 
less utilized by the member state as well as rendering the procurement 
situation in the Member State more complicated since national and Union 
policies would not be compatible. This would consequently create a result 
opposing the objective of Article 13, to facilitate the use of interoperability 
standards in the Union, since there would be less uniformity in the 
procurement of interoperability software. Based on this discussion it seems 
plausible that the objective of Article 13 could only truly be realized by 
avoiding the use of patent royalties in interoperability standards to make 
sure as many as possible can make use of the standard.    
       
It can also be argued that in the context of realizing the potential benefits of 
open-source and advocating the efficiency of Article 13 as have been done 
in this chapter, the RF requirement itself would not be necessary as long as 
no royalty bearing technology was to be included in the actual standards. 
That argument is correct to the extent that if the inclusion of FRAND would 
be based on political objectives rather than interoperable 
173
 and no such 
technologies were to be included de facto, as have been the case thus far.
174
 
Then the inclusion a RF requirement would not make a direct difference as 
to the realization of the efficiencies, even though it might have an impact 
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through the promotion of RF standards. This might very well be the case, 
but this discussion is as much about comparing RF and FRAND as the 
possible effects of a RF requirement.     
 
 
 
 
 
4.4 Fourth Condition 
 
4.4.1 Elimination of Competition 
 
The fourth and last condition that has to be fulfilled according to Article 
101(3) TFEU is that the restriction cannot “afford undertaking the 
possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part or the 
products in question”.175  
 
When it comes to recommended standards of the kind that are to be chosen 
in accordance with Article 13 it would be difficult to recognize any risk of 
elimination even though some stakeholders might find it less interesting to 
participate. Just as regarding the other conditions there is a need for 
explanation outside the words of the treaty for which the Guidelines are to 
be consulted. The Guidelines states that the protection of rivalry and the 
competitive process takes priority over potential efficiency gains, based on 
rival competition being an essential driving force that stimulates economy 
and innovation, and a potential elimination of competition would even when 
bringing short term efficiencies might well have a negative effect on the 
market in the long run.
176
 Especially when an agreement, or in this case a 
provision is creating or aiding a dominant position is it to be considered as 
having a negative impact on rival competition.  
 
The risk that a RF requirement in Article 13 would lead to elimination of 
competitors on the market must be considered as minimal for a number of 
reasons, which however does not signify that such a requirement would be 
without effect on rival competition. Since the maintenance of rival 
competition is pursued in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU it should also be 
considered important when comparing different IP approaches from a 
competition perspective.
177
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The first thing discussed in this chapter will be to what extent competitors 
would avoid participating in the standardization process because of an RF 
requirement, and if such a requirement would have negative implications on 
rival competition at all. Then a more general discussion about the effects on 
rival competition that RF and proprietary software might have will follow. 
The latter discussion will in large deal with dominant positions on the 
market and the complication therein since the dominance issue is 
particularly important in regards to the software market and prioritized in 
the Guidelines. 
 
4.4.2 Negative Effects of RF Requirement  
   
The inclusion of a RF requirement have different effects on different 
competitors, more positive for some than others, but does that really mean 
that there is a negative effect on rival competition? The main problem 
discussed on this subject is if many stakeholders would avoid participation 
in the standardization process when no royalty incentive.  
 
At first glance it might seem as though all proprietary companies holding 
valuable patents would avoid participation in setting a standard for which no 
royalties can be paid, because of the lack of financial incentives. When 
looking closer this however becomes a more nuanced issue and while some 
proprietary companies might chose to avoid participation, there are many 
others who would not. This due to the potential benefits of having one’s 
technology read on to a RF standard differs for different types of proprietary 
companies, perhaps even more so than between some proprietary and open-
source companies. 
  
In the area of software standardization it is important to recognize that there 
are a great number of ways to make money around a standard that includes 
one’s technology even without the possibility to profit from patent licensing, 
because of the network effects that benefits the technology.
178
 But this is 
depending on what kind of company it is concerning. 
 
When identifying companies that partake in standardization processes there 
are basically three different types. Pure IP companies, vertically integrated 
companies and pure downstream companies.
179
 The pure IP companies 
don’t take part in manufacturing and only produce IP to make licensing 
revenue from other companies that uses the IP. Vertically integrated 
companies produce IP through R&D as well as manufacture products with 
the IP that they have developed; Microsoft, Apple, IBM etc. are such 
companies. The pure downstream companies does not produce IP at all (at 
least for the standard in this example) but uses the standard to manufacture 
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the final product and thus making use of the IP from either the pure IP 
company, the vertically integrated company or both.
180
 
 
The pure downstream company stands only to gain from the standard being 
RF since their incentive would be to lower manufacturing costs through 
avoiding licensing fees, which would make them more efficient and 
competitive on the market. This is of course only accurate if the quality of 
the technology used would be as good as the competing.
181
 
 
When it comes to vertically integrated companies they can profit in different 
ways from having their technology included in a standard. The first one 
would be to make money from licensing the patents to the users of the 
standard, which of course would not be the case if the standard mandated 
technology to be RF. However, there are other ways for this type of 
company to make money when having their technology included in a 
standard. As stated earlier, one of the benefits of RF is the fast adoption 
rates and the quickness of the implementation, that signifies a head start on 
competing technology included in royalty bearing standards. Another 
benefit is that on the downstream market, a standard without royalties will 
always be preferred among the implementer because of its economic 
benefits and therefor increase its market share in relation to standards who 
are not RF. For a vertically integrated company who is active on that 
downstream market getting their technology included in a standard would 
mean that they could expect their market share to increase due to first-mover 
advantages and the natural monopoly characteristics and network effects 
often associated with standards. As the company developing the technology 
they would not only be first and with all likeliness the most effective at 
using the standard, but also the most qualified to produce services and 
products around the standard, such as support, add on features and upgrades, 
from which profits can be made.
182
 Since these network effects are so 
important in the software industry it has been argued that;  
 
“having even a slight advantage or head start, such as having your 
technology rather than a competitor’s included in a new standard, can 
greatly outweigh any royalties that might have been obtained under the old 
regime. Companies are therefore quite happy to compete to get their 
technology included for free.”183 
 
This does not mean that vertically integrated companies would prefer RF to 
FRAND, quite the opposite since in case of RF they would lose the 
licensing revenue. There also seem to be less incentive for companies with 
larger patent portfolios to participate than those with fewer patents, which 
might be why most SSOs still use FRAND instead of RF as the license of 
choice. But as voiced by Trond Undheim, director of Standards Strategy and 
Policy at the Oracle Corporation;  
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“The interesting thing is that, notwithstanding the fact that the 
overwhelming number of ICT standards are still created in standards 
development organizations that allow royalties to be charged, very few 
standards are ever released that do, in fact, require the payment of 
royalties—even though those that have developed them often do own patents 
that would be “necessarily infringed” by a product built to their 
standards”.184 
 
This implies that even though many market players don’t want a RF 
requirement, they neither want standards including patent royalties. This 
might seem contradictory which in a way is true, but companies prefer 
standards to be free to implement as long as they themselves don’t own the 
patented technology meaning that it would be hard to find consensus among 
a large group of stakeholders to include technology subject to royalty 
payment in an interoperability software standard.
185
 
  
 The fact that the majority of the standards chosen are without royalties is 
something relatively unique for the IT sector, and is not at all prolific in 
other markets such as telecom.
186
 So why is it so? Well first of all the 
question to consider is what is being standardized. When it comes to 
standardization of software the key factors are interoperability at the 
network layer, and these kinds of standards even though essential to 
interoperability, involves a relatively low level of technical innovation, at 
least in comparison with markets with costly needs for R&D, testing and 
manufacturing of hardware.
187
 These network effects that are the key to 
software standardization would suggest that direct compensation from 
licensing fees may well be considered by many stakeholders as less 
lucrative than the possible upsides to the network effects that would come 
from a wide implementation in the downstream market of a RF standard that 
includes their technology.
188
 
 
The suggestion that vertically integrated companies would not be opposed 
to participating in the setting of RF standards is also supported by the ease 
with which the W3C organization has attracted members.
189
 That in 
combination with the fact that several members threatened to leave the same 
organization if they were to include the use of FRAND  would suggest that 
when it comes to software interoperability standards, RF might well be a 
more effective solution than FRAND in attracting participants.
190
 
 
When it comes to pure IP companies however, the situation differs. For 
example, since a pure IP company is not active on downstream markets, 
advantages with having your technology as standard would not be more 
effective or lucrative as to other markets around the standard. Network 
effects would also not be seen as attractive benefits for such a company. 
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Hence, a RF requirement would with all likeliness mean that pure IP 
companies would not want to participate in the standardization process of 
such a standard.
191
 The exclusion of these companies would affect rival 
competition in some ways, but there are several factors to consider. First of 
all, these companies are less occupied with R&D and manufacturing of their 
own products, so they are not to be considered as especially innovative and 
are not making new products available to the consumers. This is critical 
regarding competition, since if these suggestions are correct and mainly 
pure IP companies would refrain from the standardization process then a RF 
requirement would not really have a negative effect on innovation, which is 
one of the strongest arguments against using RF standards. This argument is 
discussed here because of the need for background explanation regarding 
the different companies and their incentives but is also valid concerning 
innovation as efficiency.  
 
The mere fact that some companies would not have incentive to participate 
does not mean that the process is anti-competitive, especially since all 
companies would be allowed to participate if they so please. The same 
effect from a FRAND approach such as with W3C would hardly be 
considered anti-competitive even though it made some companies less likely 
to participate. 
 
The RF approach does not seem to prevent participation in the 
standardization process or innovation regarding software interoperability 
standards. Instead it can actually increase participation and play an essential 
part in promoting innovation on the software interoperability market.
192
  
 
4.4.3 Abuse of Dominant Position 
 
From the perspective of European Competition Law and software, abuse of 
dominant position have been the biggest issue, and the effects of dominant 
positions have been a major source of problems for public procurers of  IT 
since it is often the cause of lock-in and vendor dependence. This discussion 
on dominance and abuse will be held in the light of free and open software 
in comparison with proprietary software as well as RF and FRAND 
licensing. 
 
When it comes to abuse of dominant position in the European Union the 
software cases have been the most prolific ones, with both of the biggest 
fines given by the Commission going to the software titans Intel and 
Microsoft. That could be seen as an indication of the status of the software 
market, with some very dominant players on important product markets. 
The biggest fine of around 1 billion euro was given to Intel for offering 
loyalty rebates with the purpose to foreclose on the only other significant 
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player on the market AMD.
193
 The second biggest fine, and the biggest at 
the time was given in the Microsoft case from 2004-2007, where the 
Commission penalized Microsoft for abusing a dominant position held on 
the desktop to influence other product markets. Among the illicit practices 
in the case were inter alia “bundling” by including their own media player 
in Windows as to give their own product an advantage on the media player 
market even though competing media players where considered to be of 
higher quality.
194
  
 
The most interesting aspect of the abuse in the Microsoft Case in regards to 
the discussion at hand was that Microsoft were found to have prevented 
interoperability between their operating system and the software of other 
companies to render their own software easier to use and thus increasingly 
utilized by consumers. In hindering interoperability Microsoft was 
considered to abuse their dominant position and thus infringing European 
competition law. This is of course interesting in and of itself, but what could 
be considered even more interesting is the decision by the Commission that 
along with the fine Microsoft had to pay, they had to offer up the 
information necessary for competing network software to fully interact with 
the Windows desktop and servers, this information included the source code 
of their software.
195
 The Commission’s decision thus implies that hindering 
interoperability is negative for rival competition as well as standing against 
European competition law at least when done by a dominant player who 
uses that dominance to influence other product markets. It also demonstrates 
that the Commission considers offering up the source code to competitors as 
a way to enhance interoperability and positively influence competition. 
When discussing the competition advantages and disadvantages between 
open-source and proprietary software this is interesting to say the least since 
the punishment for preventing interoperability and abuse of dominant 
position is in this case to offer to competitors what all open-source software 
already offers by default, full interoperability information. The case was not 
without individual circumstances and the position of the Commission was 
based on the abuse of dominance on one product market to create an 
advantage on another, and is therefore not saying that proprietary software is 
negative and open-source is positive for competition across the board but it 
is however an indication that serves as an initiation for a comparison 
between proprietary and open-source or free software.
196
 An open-source 
company could not inter alia deny access to source code as to exclude 
competitors, which was the situation in the Microsoft Case. 
 
The different product markets in the software industry are often dominated 
by monopolies, oligopolies and de facto standards due to the importance of 
network effects in those markets.
197
 More often than not is it Microsoft that 
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enjoys the dominant position in these situations.
198
 But does that have to be 
negative? 
 
Because of the need for interoperability on markets like “operating 
systems”, “office suites” and “e-mail platforms” the existence of a dominant 
product can lead to positive effects due to enhanced interoperability between 
the users so long as they use the same software, and as long as the dominant 
product is superior to competing products as have often been the case 
regarding Microsoft products like “Windows” and “Office” it leads to a 
natural monopoly.
199
 The problem however, is that a solidified dominant 
position that forecloses on competitors due to that dominance will impede 
the market for which the consumers will have to pay the price through 
higher costs, lock-in and vendor dependence. Microsoft has as stated above 
been considered abusing their dominant position on the operating system 
market, and have been fined on several occasions by the Commission.
200
 
This does not mean that Microsoft is actively trying to give themselves 
unfair advantages, but with great market power come great responsibility. 
 
Negative effects can also arise from dominance without it being the result of 
abuse from the dominant player. When there is a dominant software with 
many users the network effects by themselves can become barriers to 
market entry and prevent “better” products to develop and get market shares 
since the network effects are often more important than the quality of the 
software. The needs for network effects can then create situations of lock-in 
and vendor dependence due to lack of interoperability. This is as stated 
earlier one of the main issues in public procurement.
201
  
Abusive or not, there are some clear problems when a company or product 
is dominant, but would that also be the case if the dominant product was 
“free”?202  
 
When a monopoly or dominant position arises on the software 
interoperability market as often is the case in standardization, the software 
enjoying that position might include technology with IPR attached to them 
that belong to an important market player. These rights can then be 
exploited to impede competition by disadvantaging competitors as was done 
in the Microsoft Case. The risk of this happening is greater in regards to de 
facto standards but is not limited thereto and it has been suggested that
203
 
“Sponsors of de jure and consortia standards also gain advantage from 
attracting adopters and creating lock-in, if such standards are encumbered 
by private patent claims, as are standards such as W-CDMA, MPEG-4 and 
DVD”.204 The use of FRAND when setting these standards have the 
objective of eliminating such risks, but due to the vagueness of FRAND 
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there is no guarantee that it would that desired effect.
205
 On the other hand, 
having “free” or open-source software without royalties in a monopoly 
situation either de facto or de jure creates entirely different circumstances.  
 
When a monopoly arises either naturally(de facto) or through official 
standardization (de jure) in which the technology is free to implement to all 
without royalties or restriction on usage, as with open-source software the 
monopoly is accompanied by full competition on all other markets where 
products and services are based on that technology, with no advantages or 
possibilities to foreclose on competitors for the original IP owner since there 
is no way to block or limit the usage of the standard or interoperability with 
the technology.
206
 This is the consequence of the technology being free to 
implement with full and equal access to all possible implementers, and as 
such the standard would then be available to all actors on the original and 
other markets where the standard can be relevant on terms not less 
beneficial than that of the original IP user and thus removing the possibility 
for abuse of dominant positions, creation of barriers to entry and vendor 
lock-in.
207
  
 
Even if it were possible to abuse a monopoly situation by making the 
dominant product incompatible with competing products that would not be 
in the best interest of an open-source company. As earlier stated, research 
have found that it would be more profitable for open-source software to be 
compatible with competing products even when dominant on the market due 
to the significant benefits from network effects, where the opposite was 
proven to be the case for proprietary software
208
 which might also have been 
indicated by the Commission’s decisions against proprietary software 
companies. This is not signifying that other illicit actions such as bundling 
etc. could not be committed by an open-source company in a dominant 
position any less than a proprietary one. 
 
So if software interoperability standards are adopted without royalties or 
other constraints based on IPRs that might prevent implementation, it would 
allow all potential suppliers of products and services based on the standard 
to use it without giving a competitive advantage to any individual supplier 
and thus having the most positive impact on rival competition. Such 
standards could be considered more open and accessible with natural 
monopolies regarding the technology itself but with full competition 
regarding products and services around it.
209
 
 
This openness brings with it positive effects when it comes to avoiding 
lock-in and vendor dependence as stated earlier in this thesis. Research from 
competition authorities, government, as well as authorities using such 
technologies have all reported positive results in reducing these problems.
210
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This has already been discussed in context such as “interoperability” and 
“consumer benefits” while here the focus is on the rival competition, where 
the effect of lock-in and vendor dependence is similar for competitors as for 
consumers. If an authority or other consumer is locked into a certain 
software or manufacturer that consequently means that they as costumers 
are not available to competing software, resulting in a lock-out effect from 
the market for those competitors. So the positive effects that come from 
using open-source software in regards to lock-in and reduction of vendor 
dependence have the same positive effect on rival competition as on the 
consumer market, since these outcomes are linked together, and thus having 
a positive impact on the market in general.  
 
Based on these beneficial properties of free software in combination with 
the monopolistic nature of the software markets, where the more common 
situation is that proprietary software not subject to free implementation is 
dominant with open-source software as the biggest and sometimes only 
competition,
211
 it has been suggested that public policy in favor of open-
source can be an effective tool in restoring rival competition on 
monopolistic or semi-monopolistic markets.
212
 This opinion is shared by the 
former European Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes who was 
responsible in overseeing the Microsoft case and has stated that;  
 
”Public and private procurers of technology should be smart and build their 
systems as much as possible on standards that everybody can use and 
implement without constraints: this is good for the bottom-line because it 
promotes competition between suppliers and prevents vendor lock-in”.213 
 
Because of the easy and free access for all to implement a de facto or de jure 
standard based on RF open-source software there seems to be reasoning 
behind the suggestion that a RF requirement would have a positive impact 
on rival competition in regards to dominant positions and monopoly 
markets.  
 
4.4.4 Other Effects of FRAND and RF on Rival 
Competition 
 
The objective of FRAND is to facilitate the standardization process and 
reduce the risk of abuse from IPR owners and thus enhance rival 
competition within the industry. The problem however is that committing to 
FRAND is basically a commitment to commit without that really meaning 
something concrete in a given case. This is because there is no definition or 
industry understanding of what “reasonable” or “non-discriminatory” 
actually means when applied in reality even though the understanding of the 
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terms in general is less problematic.
214
 What can be expected from the 
FRAND approach is that it will prevent IPR owners from charging higher 
royalties from one licensee than another or determine who can license or 
not, which would be very much restrictive to competition. The cost of 
licensing however is very unclear and there is nothing concrete that prevents 
a FRAND standard from being too expensive for some to implement.
215
 
What is reasonable to some might not be reasonable to others, meaning that 
smaller companies such as SMEs and open-source companies that generally 
have a stricter budget in many cases would not be able to use the standard 
since royalty payments by itself would constitute barriers to entry.
216
 This 
would then have a negative impact on the rival competition around the 
standard since all potential implementers would not have access.  
  
On the contrary to the FRAND situation, when all technology included in 
the standard are mandatory available on RF basis there is no problem with 
vagueness in the interpretation, since it is clear to all licensees and licensers 
that no money can be made from licensing and the implementation will be 
free for all. Instead of creating barriers to entry that would provide more 
openness in the process and increase access to the standard which would 
create the widest economic benefit for competition within the standard.
217
 
By making the technology in the standard free to use without royalties it 
would also lower the manufacturing cost of the products associated with the 
standard making them more available to consumers
218
, and to “Standardize 
on proprietary technology when non-proprietary alternatives are just as 
good, and you will raise costs for the industry as a whole”219 implying that 
using RF standards would improve economic conditions across the board. 
 
It would be especially beneficial for consumers and SMEs, two important 
groups with the welfare of consumers as the core of European Competition 
Law and SMEs being necessary for a competitive IT market as well as being 
an expressed priority in the Regulation.
220
 These two groups are also 
generally the ones who have the smallest voice in standardization, so to 
benefit them would be to benefit competition. 
 
There has been some critique against open-source regarding rival 
competition in that if everyone uses or can use the same code, then 
consumers cannot recognize different software from one another, hence 
limiting the distinction between the competitors and thus limiting 
competition in a cartel like fashion.
221
 That hypothesis could in a way be 
considered accurate since on most product markets the competitors have 
their own more or less unique product and if they are too similar it would 
hamper choice and competition. On the software interoperability market that 
is true as well, but the purpose of the products themselves are different than 
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on most markets because of the need for interoperability and network effects 
that are quite unique to the software market. That is why in the software 
industry compatibility competition has a higher value than incompatibility 
competition, which would likely lead to standard wars and an increased risk 
for lock-in and vendor dependence.
222
 Especially from the perspective of 
public procurement where the procuring authorities have a need for products 
that work together and very little need for clear differences between 
products.  
              
 
 
 
            
 
         
    
 
                                                 
222 M MacCarthy (2009) page 13 
 54 
5 Conclusion and Analysis  
 
5.1 Conclusions 
 This thesis and its investigation have so far examined what is legally 
required to balance the positive and negative aspects of a restriction from a 
European Competition Law perspective and the effects that the use of RF 
technology has, both within and outside of the standardization context. The 
question that is to be answered is then; whether or not a RF requirement in 
Article 13 of the Regulation would fulfill all four of the cumulative 
conditions in 101(3) TFEU and thus be considered as pro-competitive? 
 
Based on the information found in the research regarding the technological 
and financial aspects of the utilization of RF technology in ICT standards 
and how they meet with the legal requirements found in EU law and Case 
Law the conclusion made is that such a requirement fulfills all the 
conditions and most likely should be considered as pro-competitive 
according to European Competition Law. 
 
5.1.1 First Condition 
 
Regarding the first conditions “creating efficiencies” it follows from the 
Guidelines that objective “qualitative” and/or “cost” efficiencies have to be 
produced. From the same Guidelines and the case law it follows that 
enabling innovation and making new products available are considered as 
such qualitative efficiencies, and the creation of interoperability have been 
considered a strong efficiency by the Commission in the past. The 
promotion of these two qualities is also the objectives of the Regulation and 
the creation and/or facilitation of interoperability is the very scope of Article 
13. 
 
When examining the effect that RF technology and standards have had in 
regards to these efficiencies the results have been positive. RF 
interoperability standards have clearly been a key factor in the innovative 
and interoperable developments of the Internet as well as the Web. The first 
being the Digital Agendas positive example for interoperability and the Web 
being an interoperable phenomenon as well as one of the best example for 
innovative platforms that has functioned as a hub within which some of the 
biggest and most innovative companies in the world has been fostered. The 
fact that technologies such as Linux and other open-source projects are 
intertwined with RF technology in their general philosophy and their 
licensing approaches further signifies that the innovative progress that has 
been made in the software market thanks to these companies and 
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movements can to a large extent be contributed to RF technology and 
standards, and all the new products stemming from this such as Android OS 
etc. would significantly less likely exist if the technology it was built on 
required royalty payments for implementation.  
 
The negative effect that RF is said to have on innovation does not seem to 
have a significant impact on the software interoperability industry. This is 
visible from the number of participants in W3C and EITF, the latter of 
which even though not having a RF policy still very rarely chooses 
standards with for which royalties actually have to be paid, and the members 
clearly does not  protest. This is supported by the fact that very few ICT 
standards for which royalty payments have to be made actually becomes 
selected and implemented regardless of the organizations licensing 
approach. This investigation have also found that the companies avoiding 
RF standardization is essentially limited to pure upstream companies that 
are less innovative and does not  produce new products for the consumers. 
Because of the benefits in having one’s own technology in standards, RF or 
not, very few innovative companies will choose to not partake in the 
standardization. So the conclusion can be drawn that RF ICT especially 
through the Internet, the Web and the open-source movement produces 
efficiencies in regards to innovation, any significant drawback.  
 
When it comes to interoperability the mere fact that the standard would be 
free of royalty payments would make it more interoperable since fewer 
constrictions means easier and wider implementation. Regarding openness, 
which the consensus agrees is a key factor in the creation of interoperability, 
a standard should be consider more open the fewer constrains there are in 
using that standard, seeing it in another way would not be in the interest of 
interoperability. The basis for interoperability standards is to be 
implemented as widely as possible in order to gain network effects, and for 
that the interoperability standards should be implementable without royalty 
payments so to enable the widest possible implementation since the 
existence of royalties might constitute a hindrance in such an 
implementation.  
 
The fact that royalty bearing standards are incompatible with software 
covered by GPL licenses such as Linux, signifying that the use of royalties 
in the standard would prevent interoperability with some of the most 
important software available, and based on the results from authorities using 
Linux, arguably the most beneficial. This reasoning is supported not only by 
the producers of RF technology, but also by important patent holders in the 
ICT industry and Competition authorities both from Member States and the 
EU. So on the theoretical level, using RF technology increases 
interoperability, and based on the reports from authorities who uses RF 
open-source technology the conclusion can be made that it has the same 
effect in practice.  
 
The clear majority of authorities that migrated to open-source software 
experienced increased vendor independence and reduced lock-in, which 
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both stems from increased interoperability. This leads to the conclusion that 
RF technology clearly produces interoperability efficiencies that benefits the 
consumers.  
 
There seems to be a clear correlation between the demands on “efficiencies” 
in the Guidelines and case law and the efficiencies produced by RF 
technology which implies that those demands are fulfilled, since the 
efficiencies are objective and not purely beneficial to the manufacturers of 
RF software. The Commission’s reasoning in the X/Open where enabling 
interoperability and innovation in a similar fashion clearly was considered 
as efficiencies would also suggest that the efficiencies at hand would be 
considered as valid and in accordance with European Competition Law and 
the scope of the Regulation and Article 13. 
 
5.1.2 Second Condition 
  
When it comes to the second condition “fair share for the consumers” the 
focus is on public procurers since public procurement is the scope of Article 
13. The consumer advantages produced was primarily cost reduction 
through avoiding royalty and licensing expenditures and increased 
interoperability which had both economic and technological advantages. 
Increased innovation and the availability of new products are also to the 
benefit of the consumer but in a more abstract fashion so the focus on this 
part of the examination was the benefits more directly measurable. 
    
The mere fact that the technology is free from royalties and licensing fees 
produces cost efficiencies for the consumer, whether that consumer is a 
manufacturer of a product based on the standard or a public procurer trying 
to save tax-payer money. Essentially all authorities who migrated to RF 
software have successfully reduced costs by avoiding these expenditures 
and the increased interoperability have also constituted an important factor 
in cutting costs for authorities through vendor independence. Research has 
thus shown that using RF technology has benefited costumers in creating 
cost as well as quality efficiencies in several ways, since the statistic clearly 
demonstrates a positive impact on vendor lock-in and increased option in 
vendors for procurers using RF technology.   
 
These consumer benefits must however according to Competition Law 
outweigh any potential negative impact that the restriction may cause the 
consumers. The potential negative effect is that the standard would be sub-
par because stakeholders would choose to leave their technology out of the 
standardization process due to a lack of royalty incentive. If what was found 
regarding rival competition in this thesis is accurate and only upstream 
companies would avoid a RF standardization process, a theory supported by 
the number of different stakeholders in W3C and the fact that very few ICT 
standards includes royalty bearing technology. In combination with the 
voices of ICT procurers stating that royalty bearing proprietary software is 
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almost regularly more recognizable to the ICT procurers and the easier 
choice to make, there would not seem to be a concrete risk at hand for the 
inclusion of a RF requirement resulting in procurers missing out on key 
technology and thus causing a negative effect for the consumer. The risk of 
this happening could not be considered as zero, but could surely not be 
considered substantial to the extent that such a risk would be greater than 
the potential benefits that ICT procurers have when properly utilizing RF 
and open-source software.  
 
Considering the relatively meager demands in the Guidelines, that the 
positive effects for the consumers only has to cancel out the negative, and 
the reasoning in X/Open where arguably less consumer benefits, only 
increased interoperability and availability of new products were considered 
as clearly beneficial to the consumers even though the restriction in that case 
was stricter. It clearly seems as though the consumer should be considered 
to receive their “fair share” and thus fulfilling the second condition of 
Article 101(3) TFEU. Especially considering that there are more positive 
factors for the consumers in this situation than in X/Open, including 
reduction of lock-in which is one of the key aspects of ICT standardization 
as well significant cost reduction advantages. 
 
So thus far the conclusion is that based on the investigation in this thesis, the 
two positive conditions in Article 101(3) TFEU would be fulfilled by a RF 
requirement through the production of efficiencies for which the consumers 
receive their “fair share”.  
 
5.1.3 Third Condition 
 
As to the third condition and the first of the two negative ones 
“indispensability of the restriction” it follows the Guidelines and case law 
that the efficiencies have to be less likely to be realized without the 
restriction and not impossible to realize without the restriction. This is 
demonstrated in the X/Open case where the Commission found that the 
condition was fulfilled since the group would be less efficient without the 
restriction which consequently would make the realization of efficiencies 
more difficult. 
 
Software registered under a GPL license, which is the majority of open-
source projects are incompatible with FRAND, at least to the extent the 
FRAND standard would actually be subject to royalty payment. As seen 
regarding innovation, interoperability and overall consumer benefits, Linux 
and its derivatives have been one of if not the most important technology in 
creating the efficiencies discussed in this thesis regarding innovation, 
interoperability and cost reductions in public procurement. Using FRAND 
would be especially damaging to interoperability since it would render the 
standard incompatible with the majority of open-source software. With 
interoperability being the objective of Article 13, the inclusion of royalty 
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bearing standards would definitely make the realization of the discussed 
efficiencies more difficult and possibly impossible depending on the extent 
to which actual royalties are used. The license issue also highlights the close 
relationship between RF and open source, which is an important factor in 
this discussion.   
 
For the realization of the efficiencies, especially the ones stemming from 
open-source the consensus among procurers and other stakeholders seem to 
be that there is need for policy initiatives in favor of RF and open-source 
software to level the playing field, meaning that without provisions like 
Article 13 promoting RF software the efficiencies would be less realizable. 
  
Another important factor for these efficiencies to come to fruition is that 
procurers actually use the standard. That is also the whole idea of having 
interoperability standards as well as the objective of EU standardization, 
that the standards are widely used among procurers within the Union. 
Considering the national development in ICT procurement where several 
Member States have taken initiatives and created policies promoting the use 
of RF or open-source technology and in some cases only allowing 
procurement of royalty bearing ICT when no other option is possible. 
Several procurers will not be able to use the standards to the extent it 
includes royalties, and that Union and National procurement policies will 
clash with each other on several occasions, rendering the ICT procurement 
situation less clear and thus more complicated. That would make the 
efficiencies of using RF technology in the standard less realizable as well 
opposing the scope of Article 13 of and EU standardization policy. This also 
implies that it would not be in the best interest of Article 13 and Union 
standardization policy in general to select standards including royalties. 
   
Considering these effects of using FRAND and royalty bearing technology 
on the realization of efficiencies discussed in this thesis in relation with the 
legal demands from the Guidelines and case law regarding what constitutes 
“indispensability of restriction” and especially the Commissions reasoning 
in X/Open the conclusion is that the restriction in the form of a RF 
requirement om Article 13 would be considered necessary and thus 
fulfilling the third condition of Article 101(3) TFEU.  
 
5.1.4 Fourth Condition 
 
The fourth and last condition that needs to be met for the restriction to be 
considered as pro-competitive, states that the restriction cannot allow 
“elimination of competition” with additional consideration regarding 
creation of dominance on the market. From the Guidelines and the case law 
it also follows that the market situation needs to be analyzed to make a 
realistic assessment of the competition and that the promotion of rival 
competition is a priority of European Competition Law. 
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First of all we have to recognize that we are discussing voluntary standards 
available for public procurement. Meaning that there is no forcing or 
exclusion involved, and even though some stakeholders might avoid 
participation they are not closed out from the process, but chooses to do so 
freely. The standards selected on RF basis would be available to all 
competitors on the same conditions and the fact that the standard would be 
RF would create a more even playing field on markets where the standard is 
implemented since it is not giving advantages to a financially stronger 
implementer. Considering that the fact that the X/Open group would share 
their information and the technologies among themselves as well as with 
other competitors made the Commission come to the conclusion that no 
competition could be eliminated by the restriction. A restriction that was 
stricter and more direct than the restriction examined in this thesis would 
constitute. The conclusion is thus that based on the nature of the restriction 
at hand and the requirements on competition in the Guidelines and case law, 
a RF requirement in Article 13 of the Regulation would not make possible 
the elimination of competition according to European Competition Law. 
           
But since the Guidelines promote rival competition and this thesis is about a 
comparison from a competition perspective the examination also included 
the overall effect of RF technology on rival competition.  
 
It was found in that regard that few stakeholders would avoid the 
standardization process because of a RF requirement and that all except pure 
upstream companies would benefit from participating in such 
standardization. This was supported both theoretically and practically by the 
many members of organizations with RF policies as well as the low number 
of ICT standards with royalty payments that are actually selected and 
implemented even without RF requirements.  
 
When concerning dominant positions and potential abuse thereof, the 
investigation showed that the use of RF and open-source software is 
beneficial especially in presence of natural monopolies which often is the 
case for standardized technology. Considering the unique properties of the 
software interoperability market and the need for network effects that often 
creates dominant positions and monopolies, the need for interoperability and 
openness for a competitive market is significant. Based on the investigation 
regarding rival competition in this thesis, it is suggested that using RF 
standards would increase interoperability and network effects while 
lowering barriers to entry as well as mitigating risk of lock-in and vendor 
dependence which all would be beneficial to rival competition.  
 
Since when it comes to participation in the standardization process there 
seem to be few companies that would actually opt to not partake depending 
on their business model, while several stakeholders seem to prefer the RF 
approach, leading to the belief that RF might even be a way to attract 
participants rather than discourage them, rendering RF standards a positive 
influence on rival competition. So the conclusion is that not only is a RF 
requirement not capable of eliminating competition but the use and 
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promotion of RF standards and open-source software is positive for rival 
competition.  
 
This leads to the overall conclusion that including the requirement for 
technology to be available on a RF basis to be eligible for the standards set 
in accordance with Article 13 of the Regulation would fulfill all the four 
cumulative conditions stated in Article 101(3) TFEU and thus be considered 
as pro-competitive according to European Competition Law. Another 
conclusion is subsequently that RF is a more adapt licensing approach than 
FRAND when setting voluntary ICT standards from a competition 
perspective.   
 
5.2 Analysis 
  
There are certain things that are important to keep in mind when examining 
which licensing form that is better from a competition standpoint is first, 
what is it to be used for, and second, what is it to be used on?  
 
In this case the licensing form is to be used for voluntary standards in public 
procurement. It is important to keep that in mind since it is a major 
consideration in most parts of the discussions and it limits the strictness of 
the restriction on several levels. The scope of Article 13 is to facilitate and 
make public ICT procurement in the Union more effective, so the main 
objective is to optimize the situation for the procurers. As the research for 
this thesis has confirmed there are many benefits in using RF standards for 
public ICT procurement that from a competition standpoint outweighs the 
negative effects of a restriction against technology that is not available on 
RF basis. This would most likely not be the case if the restriction instead of 
a recommended standard was regarding all ICT technology available for 
public procurement. Research has demonstrated that RF technology is not 
always better and to limit the options of the public procurers would go 
against the objective of European ICT standardization. In this case since it is 
regarding voluntary standards available to help the procurers, the situation 
changes, and based on the information in this thesis there are several 
advantages that can be gained by promoting RF technology, especially in 
public procurement, and including a RF requirement in a provision such as 
Article 13 would produce such a promotion at very little cost or risks for 
either the EU, competition in the ICT industry or the procurers.  
 
The situation regarding rival competition would also change rather 
dramatically if the discussion were about something more intrusive than 
voluntary standards.  
 
The second thing to keep in mind is what the license form is to be used on, 
hence what kind of technology. As we have seen in this thesis, the special 
industry characteristics is what makes RF such a popular and successful 
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licensing form within the ICT market, which obviously does not imply that 
RF policies would be right for other industries.  
 
However, on the interoperability software market it seems that RF standards 
is and can be very beneficial in public procurement and that the promotion 
of such standards is needed to fully exploit these benefits. While it is 
important to promote such technology it is equally important not to force or 
limit the procurer’s options, especially considering the difficulties in 
properly using open-source software and the fact that proprietary software 
sometimes is the better and more appropriate option. Considering this 
situation I am of the opinion that the best solution would be to adopt 
policies that prioritize RF technology when “as good or better” than the 
proprietary option with the obligation to produce a motivation when 
procuring proprietary software for interoperability purposes. Since for 
example Sweden for several years has recommended the use of open 
standards in accordance with the definition in EIF version 1.0 with very 
little result it suggests the need for more than mere recommendations to 
activate the procurers in utilizing RF technology.  
 
There is also an argument to be made that the nature of interoperability 
software and the scope of its usage is promoting it to be available on a RF 
basis for it to have its intended effect. The fact that so few ICT standards, 
such as regarding the Internet or the Web are subjected to royalty payments 
and basically all important stakeholders still participate supports that 
argument. That is likely why all the standards selected by the Commission 
in accordance with Article 13 to this point has been RF, and based on the 
results of my investigation and the status of the ICT industry I doubt that 
they will include royalty bearing technology in the future standards.  
 
This might well be an effective approach, to have FRAND but only select 
RF technology to be included in the actual standards. That way the lobby 
groups promoting FRAND will remain contented, since most of the 
significant proprietary companies partake in the setting of RF standards 
regarding the Web and Internet without objecting, their motivation seems to 
be preventing RF from becoming the norm in the software industry rather 
than to actually have ICT standards covered with royalty payments. While 
not including any royalty bearing technology would still mean that the 
standards are compatible with Linux and all other open-source software 
covered by GPL licenses and thus being fully interoperable and with less 
constrains. That would also imply that RF is a better approach than FRAND 
for ICT standardization, since if all technology included in the standards are 
without royalties, the policy is in practice RF rather than FRAND. This is 
not a bad solution considering all aspects of the industry, and does not seem 
to directly step on anyone’s toes. 
 
The big problem regarding interoperability standards and rival competition 
would be if the FRAND approach would mean the actual inclusion of 
royalty payments for the use of the standards, which means that some of the 
problems discussed in this thesis would to a large extent be mitigated by the 
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situation remaining as it is today, with FRAND but without actual royalties. 
For example, based on this thesis, the inclusion of royalties in the actual 
standards would most likely not fulfill the conditions in Article 101(3) 
TFEU, if any of them. 
 
Personally however, I miss the promotion of RF and open-source software 
from a Competition Law standpoint that a RF requirement in Article 13 
would signify. Based on the research made for this thesis there seem to be 
several competition reasons to have an RF requirement that transcends the 
mere inclusion of royalties in the actual standards. Interviews with ICT 
procurers and policy makers show that there is a need for positive 
reinforcement from government policies to properly utilize open-source in 
public procurement. Such policies can have positive impact on rival 
competition since the open-source alternative on many software markets is 
the main or only competitor to dominant proprietary software, such 
promotions can also be utilized by policy maker as a tool to create better 
balance on monopoly or oligopoly markets. Using a RF requirement would 
also make the process clearer and provide another lever of transparency and 
security for stakeholders and implementers, since it would guarantee that 
future standards will be available on a RF basis. 
 
Most of the efficiencies discussed in this thesis have been regarding the use 
of RF and open-source software and the realization of those efficiencies are 
largely depending on procurers easily being able to access such technology, 
and promotion through policy initiatives seem essential for such 
facilitations. So even if some of the problems with using FRAND instead of 
RF can be sidestepped by not including royalties in the actual standards, 
many of the potential benefits can still be more difficult to realize due to 
lack of policy support for such technologies. Consequently, a RF 
requirement would still be more pro-competitive than a FRAND that in 
actuality does not produce royalty bearing standards (not to confuse with 
FRAND-Z) because of its legal certainty, efficiency and especially its 
promotion of RF technology in public procurement outside of the standard 
itself. This promotion might also be the reason behind the proprietary 
software lobby’s interest in EIF and other Union initiatives using FRAND 
instead of RF even though there is not the same interest in actually having 
royalty bearing technology included in the standards, and most proprietary 
company in reality seem to prefer RF when it comes to interoperability 
software standardization.   
 
Another important aspect is what licensing approach would be most 
beneficial in realizing the objectives of Article 13 and EU’s ICT 
standardization policy in general. These objectives include the creation of 
interoperability and the promotion of innovation and competition. From the 
research made for and presented in this thesis and the conclusions already 
made regarding these three objectives, the conclusion is that a RF policy 
would a better solution than FRAND in accomplishing the objectives of ICT 
standardization in the European Union.  
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